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NonviolentAbortionClinicProtests:
ReevaluatingSome CurrentAssumptions
aboutthe ProperScope of Government
Regulations
Leslie Gielow.Jacobs·
Regulation of nonviolent political-protest activities outside abortion clinics must
balancethe constitutionalrightstofree speech and to chooseabortion,and the social value of
nonviolentpolitical protest. This Article examines and questions two current assumptions
about the proper scope of government.regulations. The first assumption is that, absent a
constitutionalobstacleunder prevailingfree speechjurisprudence,it is appropriateto enjoin
or statutorilyenhance sanctionsfor any variety of nonviolentpolitical-protestactivities that
block access to clinicsor constituteillegaltrespasses. ThisArticle argues thatfor a particular
type of nonviolentpoliticalprotest-,;onduct that is equivalentto speech on a public issue-the _
general, bui rebuttable presumption should be that neither of these extra burdens is
appropriate. The second assumption is that restrictionson "harassing" speech; absent
threatenedor actualphysical hann, necessarilyconflictwith the values that underliethe First
Amendment. This Article argues that current constitutionalanalysisplaces disproportionate
weight on thefree speech right andinsufficientlyrecognizesthe equality interestthat underlies
the right to choose abortion. The Article concludes that a slight shift in focus would
accommodateboth interestsmorefully, allowing regulationmorefreely wherepolitical-protest
activitiesare targetedat specificindividualsor occur in clCJse
proximityto the targets.
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INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed the constitutional right to choose abortion1--or

1.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
("[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wadeshould be retained and once again reaffinned.").
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perhaps more accurately because of it2-abortion protests staged
outside of abortion clinics continue to grab the headlines. 3 Although
news of the most violent protest activities, particularly the killing of
abortion doctors, shock and appall even most pro-life activists,4 reports
of these and other acts of protest inform the public about the nature of
the protesters' views and thereby contribute to an ongoing national
debate about the justice of permitting or restricting access to abortion.
This contribution to political discussion places abortion protest
activities in the sphere potentially protected by the Constitution's free
speech guarantee.5 But abortion protest has nonspeech effects as well.
2.
See id. at 1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (comparing
the Court's decision to reaffinn a constitutional right to choose abortion to the Dred Scott
·decision,and noting that continued judicial involvement in the abortion question "merely
prolongsand intensifiesthe [country'sJanguish").
3.
See, e.g., Abortion Clinics Gird for 4 Days of Protests, ST. LoUis PoSTDISPATCH,July 25, 1995, at 8A; Abortion Protester Accused of Violating Clinic Access Law,
COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 18, 1995, at 2B; Carla Hall & Duke Helfand, 25
Arrested At Abortion Clinic Protest, L.A. TIMES,May 28, 1995, at BI.
4.
See, e.g., Virginia Culver & Hank Rosenblum, Kids Join Abortion Protesters,
800People at Capitolfor Right to Life Rally, DENVERPOST,Jan. 22, 1995, at Cl ("[S]everal
times,the [Denver]archbishop condemned the killings of abortion clinic doctors and staff in
Florida and Massachusetts.");Terry Mattingly, Decrying the Use of Violence By Pro-Life
Extremists, Those Who Advocate Killing Abortion Doctors Stain Pro-Life Movement,
MOUNTAIN
NEWS,Aug. 6, 1994, at 130 (noting that the National
Spokesmen Say, ROCKY
Right to Life Committee and Cardinal Roger Mahoney, head of the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops' Pro-Life Committee, oppose abortion clinic violence); Michael Moran,
No Martyr, ORI.ANDO SENTINEL,
Dec. 22, 1994, at Al4 (letters to the editorial) ('The
Pensacolaabortion protester, Paul Hill, who was found guilty of killing an abortion doctor
and his bodyguard,will not be hailed as a martyr. The vast majority of pro-life Americans
consider the acts of this man to be a tragedy. It was right to punish him."); Pro-Life
(Greensboro, N.C.), Jan. 11,
Supporters Want All Clinic Killings to Stop, NEWS& RECORD
1995, at A8 (letters to the editor) ("[T]he majority -of us [pro-life advocates] abhor the
killingsof abortion doctors , ... "); Robertson Denounces Shooting of Abortionists, WASH.
TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1993, at AIO ("Killing doctors who perfonn abortions hurts pro-life efforts,
religious broadcaster Pat Robertson said yesterday."); Jim Yardly, Abortion War: More
Bloodshed Ahead? Slaying of Abortion Doctor Reflects Growing Desperation, ATIANTA J.
& CONST.,
Feb. 26, 1994, at A3 (quoting Paul Liton of Chicago-basedAmericans United for
Life as disapprovingof abortion clinic violence). But see Clinic Suspect: If Guilty, I Want
Jan. 6, 1995, at 4
to Die; Foe of Abortion Agrees Not to Fight Extradition, CHI. TRIBUNE,
(noting that Donald Spitz, director of Pro-Life Virginia, signed a petition endorsing the
beliefthat killing abortion doctors is justifiable).
5.
See, e.g., Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 816 (1984) (noting that "political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure
of constitutionalprotection" and that speech such as "Abortion is Murder" might be entitled
to an exemption from a speech-restrictiveordinance as well); Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d
1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986) ('The Supreme Court has often stated that speech on issues of
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One obvious effect of violent activities is injury to the victims. In
addition, consistent with their aim,6 abortion protesters often stop
abortions from being performed, either temporarily, by blocking access
to abortion clinics,7 or permanently, by causing some women not to
obtain abortions because of delay,8 fear of violence from the protesters 9
or others, 10 or lack of services in the area.11 Even if they do not
ultimately stop particular abortions from occurring, these protest
activities exact great physical, 12 financial, 13 and psychological 14 costs
from individuals seeking abortion services.

public concern occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values' and
is entitled to 'special protection."'), rev'd, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993) ("Anti-abortion
6.
activists have made it plain that th[eir] conduct is part of a deliberate campaign to eliminate
access [to abortion] by closing clinics and intimidating doctors.") .
Id. at 14 ("By making clinics inaccessible to patients and staff alike, blockades
7.
and invasions deprive people of needed health care services.").
8.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pav . Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 88586 (1992) (detailing, but rejecting as constituting a substantial burden on the right to choose
abortion, district court findings that the delay caused by a mandatory 24-hour waiting period
before obtaining an abortion ·would cause some women not to be able to obtain abortions,
particularly those "who have the fewest financial resources, those who must travel long
distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands,
employers, or others .... ").
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that "blockades [may]
9.
make access to a health care facility difficult or hazardous").
10. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-98 (detailing the nature and frequency of
domestic abuse and acknowledging that learning of a pregnancy or intended abortion may
provoke violence from a woman's male partner).
11. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, supra note 6, at 17 ("Abortion may remain a legal
option in this country, but.there will be so few providers that access will become limited and
in some cases unavailable." (quoting the testimony of Dr. Rodriguez before the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee, May 12; 1993)).
12. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he risks associated with an abortion increase if the patient suffers
from additional stress and anxiety [caused by abortion protest activities]. Increased stress
and anxiety can cause patients to: (1) have elevated blood pressure ; (2) hyperventilate;
(3) require sedation; or (4) require special counseling and attention before they are able to
obtain health care. Patients may become so agitated that they are unable to lie still in the
operating room thereby increasing the risks associated with surgery."), aff 'd sub nom. ProChoice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated in part on reh'g en bane,
67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (acknowledging, but rejecting as a substantial
burden on the right to choose abortion, the financial burden of a 24-hour delay in obtaining
,
abortion services).
14. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, supra note 6, at 15 (noting the "traumatic effects" of
abortion protests on women seeking abortions).
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These various effects of abortion protest activities set up the
perceived conflict between the constitutional rights to free speech and
to choose abortion. 15 Moreover, even though there is not a constitutional right to engage in nonviolent political protest that blocks access
to abortion clinics 16 or constitutes illegal trespass, 17 such activities may
constitute an extraordinarily powerful means of expression and thus
have social value that should be considered by legislatures and courts
in deciding whether and how to restrict the participants.
Congress, local legislative bodies, and courts have struggled to
reconcile these apparently competing rights and values. A recent
federal statute, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (the
FACE Act),18 provides heavy crimi1:1aland civil sanctions for protest
activities that involve violence or threats of violence, or which have
the effect of blocking access to abortion services. The statute also
prohibits protest activities that "intimidate" abortion seekers and
providers,19 defining "intimidate" as to require a reasonable fear of
physical harm.20 Courts have followed similar guidelines in reviewing
local ordinances and state-court injunctions. That is, where restrictions
on abortion protests are necessary to prevent threatened or actual
violence or to guarantee clinic access, courts have upheld them. But
courts have by and large invalidated restrictions on "harassing"
conduct that is not deemed to constitute a threat of physical violence.
The boundaries of the new federal statute and judicial review of
other abortion protest regulations mirror the assumptions that underlie
current Supreme Court doctrine. This Article focuses on two of these
assumptions. The first assumption is that absent a constitutional
obstacle under prevailing free speech jurisprudence, it is appropriate to
enjoin or statutorily enhance sanctions for any variety of nonviolent
15. See, e.g., MississippiWomen'sMed. Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 795 (5th
Cir. 1989) ('This case presents a conflict between the First Amendment rights of the
protestersto advocatea right-to-lifeposition and the privacyinterestsof women who seek to
have abortions performed at the clinic, while being insulated from the protesters'
advocacy.").
16. See Madsenv. Women'sHealth Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994) (holding
that an injunction is appropriate to "protect[] unfettered ingress to and egress from the
clinic").
17. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,407 U.S. 551, 567-68 (1972) (stating that the
FirstAmendmentdoes not create a right to trespasson private property).
18. 18 u.s.c.§ 248 (1994).
19. Id. § 248(a)(l)-(2).
20. Id. § 248(e)(3).
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political-protest activities that block access to clinics or constitute
illegal trespasses. The second assumption is that restrictions on
"harassing" speech, absent threatened or actual physical harm,
necessarily conflict with the values that underlie the First Amendment.
This Article evaluates and harmonizes the scope of the free speech
right, the right to choose abortion, and the social value of nonviolent
political protest, thereby questioning both of these assumptions.
Part I provides a brief outline of the perceived conflict between
the right to choose abortion, the right to free speech, and the social
value of nonviolent political protest. Part II examines the values that
underlie these rights and interests, redefining the constitutional rights
to include commitments to substantive equality among citizens and
identifying the social value of protest activities as stemming from their
communicative impact on political debate.
Part m takes a close look at the two assumptions that dictate the
scope of current abortion protest restrictions and then proposes the
proper scope of the rights and interests in the context of particular
protest activities.
More specifically, Part ill.A identifies the
assumptions that underlie the current scope of restrictions on abortion
protests. Part m.B compares the social value of nonviolent political
protest with the equality value that underlies the right to choose
abortion and reveals that current law sweeps too broadly in restricting
nonviolent political-protest activities. Although the Constitution as
currently interpreted does not prohibit such regulations, they conflict
as a matter of wise policy with the social value of nonviolent political
protest. Parts m.B.1 and .2, respectively, examine both the propriety
of granting injunctive relief and enhancing retrospective relief for
nonviolent lawbreaking. After isolating the type of nonviolent
political protest entitled to special regard-conduct that is equivalent
to speech on a public issue-this Part concludes that, consistent with
both the social value of nonviolent political protest and the
constitutional right to choose abortion, the general presumption should
be that neither of these extra burdens are appropriate. This
presumption leaves open the possibility that ·particular facts would
make an injunction appropriate in specific circumstances.
Part m.cfurther demonstrates that current constitutional doctrine
is unduly narrow in allowing regulation of harassing abortion protest
speech only when it is connected with physical threats or injury or
occurs immediately outside private residences. Part ill.C.1 details
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current Supreme Court free speech doctrine and explains why this
doctrine places disproportionate weight on the free speech right and
insufficientlyrecognizes the equality interest that underlies the right to
choose abortion. Part ill.C.2 then proposes a slight shift in focus that
would allow regulation more freely where the activities are targeted at
specific individuals or occur in close proximity to the targets. This
Part concludes that by allowing for greater government regulation of
certain abortion protest activities that harass abortion seekers,
constitutional doctrine would more fully accommodate both the
important social interests in free and open political discussion that
underpin the free speech right and the similarly important social
interestin effectuating the equality interest that defines the scope of the
rightto choose abortion.

II.

BRIEF 0U1LINE OF THE PERCEIVED CONHJCT OF THE RIGHTS AND

INTEREsTS

Recent activities by abortion protesters at abortion clinics 21 and
the legislative and judicial responses to those activities present a
potentialconflict between the right to choose abortion, the free speech
right,22 and the social value of nonviolent political protest.23 The
21. Sometimes.the protest activities extend beyond the vicinities of abortion clinics
to the neighborhoods and homes of clinic employees. See,.e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health
Ctr.,Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994) ("Doctors and clinic workers, in turn, were not
immuneeven in their homes. Petitioners picketed in front of clinic employees' residences;
shoutedat passersby; rang the doorbells of neighbors and provided literature identifying ·the
particularclinic employee as a 'baby killer.' Occasionally, the protestors would confront
minor children of clinic employees who were home alone."). Protest activities also include
the· establishment of phony abortion counseling clinics advertised in the yellow pages and
elsewhereto lure prospective patients in for aggressive antiabortion persuasion. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying woman's claim for
damagesunder 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) based upon activities of the "AAA Pregnancy
Problem Center'' listed in the yellow pages under "Abortion Information and Services" but
run by an organization opposed to abortion), vacated on reh'g en bane, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 908 (1993); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Beyond
Bray: Obtaining Federal Jurisdiction to Stop Anti-abortion Violence, 6 YALEJ.L. &
F'EMINlsM
155, 167-71 (1994) (detailing the activities of fake abortion clinics).
22. See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Our sister circuit
describeda similar abortion protest case as a 'clash . . . between constitutional rights defined
by the Supreme Court: an old one tracing its roots to the speech clause of the First
Amendmentand before, and a new one stemming from Roe v. Wade."' (quoting Mississippi
Women'sMed. Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1989))), vacated on reh'g en
bane,41 FJd 1421 (11th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
23. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful
Constitutionalityof the Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA.J. Soc. Pm.'Y & L. 261, 261 (1994)
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tactics of Operation Rescue24 are perhaps most well-known and
provide the subject matter of much abortion protest-related litigation.25
A primary activity of this organization is to stage demonstrations at
abortion clinics, the purpose of which are to close the clinics and
thereby "rescue" the fetuses scheduled for abortion.26 · These clinic
demonstrations-and other antiabortion protests-include a host of
more specific activities, ranging from picketing,27 distribution of
literature,28 chanting,29 and attempts at sidewalk persuasion-also
called "counseling"30-to trespasses on clinic property to blockade it,3'
(noting, with respect to abortion protests, that "[t]his is not the first time in this nation's
history that street demonstrations, sit-ins, and civil disobedience have been in the forefront
..
of political activity on a particular issue").
24. Operation Rescue is an organization dedicated to demonstrate for the antichoice
position. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text (describing Operation Rescue's
tactics).
25. See, e.g., National Organization for Women [hereinafter NOW] v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp: 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989), ajf'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd
in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); Town of
W. Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 373-75 (D. Conn. 1989), vacated, 915
F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1989);
Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F.
Supp. 1247, 1251 (S.D.N.Y.), aff 'd as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 947 (1990); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. ~77, 582 (E.D. Pa . 1989),
aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).
26. NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1487.
27: See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,.:Inc.; 114 S. a. 2516, 2521 (1994)
(noting that petitioners "picketed and demonstrated where the public street gives access to
the clinic"); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 696-99 (D. Ariz. 1994) (noting that petitioners
"st[ood] in anti-abortion picket lines that impeded the most direct and convenient access to
the facility"); Hoffman v. Hunt, 845 F. Supp. 340,343 (W.D.N.C. 1994) ("Plaintiffs' efforts
outside the abortion clinics have [included] . . . 'protest marches, ... display of signs and
placards, ... [and] organized picketing .... "'):
28. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 883 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (C.D. Cal.)
(describing how plaintiffs sought to "engage in peaceful hand-to-hand leafletting"), vacated,
70 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 1995); Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 696-99 (stating that plaintiffs' activities
included "distribut[ing] literature"); Hoffman,845 F. Supp. at 343 ("Plaintiffs' efforts
outside the abortion clinics have [included] . . . leafletting .... ").
29. See, e.g., Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521 (noting, as to the abortion protests at issue,
that "the noise varied from singing and chanting to the use of louclspeakers and bullhorns").
30. See, e.g., id. (noting that the lower court "found that as vehicles heading toward
the clinic slowed to allow the protesters to move out of the way, 'sidewalk counselors'
would approach and attempt to give the vehicle's occupants antiabortion literature");
Edwards, 883 F. Supp. at 1382 (explaining that plaintiffs sought to provide "one-on-one
counseling about abortion alternatives"); Riely, 860 F. Supp. at 696s99 (stating that
plaintiffs' activities included "sidewalk counseling in opposition to abortion on public ways
and sidewalks outside of abortion facilities").
31. See, e.g., NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (E.D. Va. 1989)
("[D)emonstrators . .. intentionally trespass on the clinic's premises for the purpose of
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32
3
name-calling,
destruction of clinic property,3
threats of violence,34
andactualviolencedirectedat clinic patients and personnel.3s
In reaction to these activities, Congress recently enacted the
Freedomof Accessto Clinic EntrancesAct(FACE Act).36 This statute
prohibitsanyone,by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,
from intentionallyattempting or actually injµring, intimidating, or
interferingwith anyone seeking or providing reproductive health
servicesor damaging or destroying the property of facilities that

·,

blockadingthe clinic'sentrancesand exits .. .. "), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd
inpart sub nom. Bray v. AlexanderWomen's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); S. REP.
No.117,supranote 6, at 7 ("[Duringclinic blockades] [t]ypically,dozens of persons-and
in somecaseshundredsor even thousands-trespass onto clinic property and physically
barricadeentrancesand exits by sitting or lying down or by standing and interlockingtheir
arms.").
32. See, e.g.,Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428,449 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[P]rotesterswho
blockadethe clinics screamdiscriminatoryepithets to women attempting to enter, such as
'lesbians,killers... lesbianscan't have babies.'.").
33. See,e.g., NOW,726 F. Supp. at 1489 ("'Rescuers' did more than trespass on to
the clinic'spropertyand physicallyblock all entrances and exists {sic]. They also defaced
clinicsigns,damagedfences and blocked ingress into and egress from the Clinic's parking
lot by parkinga car in the center of the parking lot entrance and deflatingits tires. On this
and other occasions,'rescuers' have strewn nails on the parking lots and public streets
abutting~ cli~cs to preventthe passageof any cars."); S. REP.No. 117, supra note 6, at 5
(''Facilitiesat which abortion services are provided have increasingly been the target of
arsonfires,bombings,firebornbingsand chemicalattacks;'').
34. See,e.g., S. REP. No. 117,supra note 6, at 10 {"A number of abortion providers
havebeensubjectedto death threats and other threats of violence.").
35. See,e.g., id. at 7 ('These human barricades [createdby anti-abortionprotesters]
often involve pushing, shoving, destruction of equipment and other violent acts as
blockaderstry to keep patients and staff from entering the clinic."); id. at 3 ("From 1977 to
April1993,morethan1,000acts of violenceagainst abortionproviderswere reported in the
UnitedStates. Theseacts included at least 36 bombings, 81 arsons, 131 death threats, 84
assaults,two kidnappings,327 clinic invasions, and one murder."); Katherine A. Hilber,
Note,ConstitutionalFace-Off: Testing the Validityof the Freedom of Access to Clinic
EntrancesAct, 72 U. DET.MERCY
L. REV.143, 149-50 & nn.53-54 (1994) (detailing the
additionalmurdersof abortion practitionersand clinic employees since the 1993· Senate
Report)
; EvelynFigueroa& Mette Kurth, Recent Development,Madsen and the FACEAct:
AbortionRightsor TrafficControl?,5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 247, 248 n.5 (1994) ("During
clinicinvasionsabortion providers have been 'pinched, hit, grabbed, kicked,' slammed
against walls, dragged outdoors, crushed by crowds, and terrorized with drive-by
shootings."(citingBrief of the Center for ReproductiveLaw and Policy,National Abortion
andReproductiveRights Action League (NARAL),Women's Law Project, Women's Legal
DefenseFund, NationalWomen's Law Center, and AmericanJewish Committeeat 6 n.10,
as AmiciCuriaein Supportof Respondents,Madsen v.Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S.
Ct.2516(1994)(No. 93-880))). .
36. 18u.s.c. § 248 (1994).
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provide reproductive health services. 37 The FACE Act empowers
courts to grant injunctive relief and damages in private suits brought
by persons protected by the statute,38 and also authorizes the Attorney
· General of the United States to seek injunctive relief or the imposition
of civil or criminal penalties against those who violate the Act.39 Prior
to the enactment of the FACE Act, a series of federal courts had
interpreted another federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),40 as a potential
source of both injunctive relief and damages for women whose access
to abortion was impeded by the activities of antiabortion protesters.41
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that abortion protests
are not directed at women as a class and therefore do not satisfy this
prerequisite for relief under § 1985(3).42

37. Id. § 248(1), (3). The FACE Act also prohibits the same activities directed at
"any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of
religious freedom at a place of religious worship ," id. § 248(2), or at the property of a place
of religious worship, id. § 248(3).
38. Id. § 248(c)(l) .
39. Id. § 248(2). The FACE Act also authorizes state attorneys general to bring
parens patriae actions seeking the civil remedies authorized in the statute. Id. § 248(3) .
. 40 . Section 1985(3) provides relief to "any person or class of persons" deprived by a
conspiracy of two or more · persons "of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." Courts that found women to constitute a class
against which the requisite animus was directed by antiabortion protesters found the right
deprived to be either the right to travel, or a privacy right, or both. See Georgia M. Sullivan,
Note, Protectionof Constitutional Guaranteesunder 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): Operation
Rescue's "Summer of Mercy", 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 237, 242-46 (1992) (outlining the
development of§ 1985(3)).
41.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Pearson Found., lnc., 908 F.2d 318, 320-24 (8th Cir. 1990),
vacated on reh'g en bane, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 507 U.S .
908 (1993); Pro-Choice Network v. Project.Rescue, 799 F. Supp . 1417, 1429-30 (W.D. N.Y.
1992), ajf'd sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated
in part on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
1260 (1996); Town ofW. Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 792 F. Supp . 161, 167 (D. Conn.
1992), vacated in part, 991 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Syversen v. Summit
Women's Center W., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 185 (1993); Women's Health Care Servs., .P.A. v.
Operation Rescue-Nat'!, 773 F. Supp. 258, 265-66 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 24 F.3d 107 (10th
Cir. 1994); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp . 1483, 1496-98 (E.D. Va 1989), aff'd,
914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Oinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life,
Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or. 1989), rev'd, 34 F.3d 845 (9th Cir.), amended on denial
of reh'g, 62 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1994); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 580-84
(E.D. Pa. 1989), ajf'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F.
Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated in part, 991 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 185 (1993).
42. Bray, 506 U.S. at 269'..
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Also prior to the enactment of the FACE Act, a f.ew courts
interpretedthe civil provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
OrganizationsAct (RIC0), 43 as a potential source of injunctive relief
and damages for clinics whose business or property were disrupted or
damaged by abortion protest activities.44 In one such case, the
SupremeCourt affirmed that an "enterprise" within the meaning of the
statute did not need to have an economic motivation, 45 thus leaving
this statute as an avenue of relief against abortion protests in addition
to the FACE Act.46
In addition to federal relief, courts have used state law as the
basis for issuing injunctions against the .activities of abortion
protesters. Specifically, these c~urts have mandated buffer zones
around abortion clinic premises and the residences of clinic staff, in
which a broader range of activities than those set out in the FACE Act
are prohibited. Because the Supreme Court recently upheld such a
state-court order,47 these buffer-zone injunctions remain a potential
alternativeor supplement to FACE Act remedies.
Defenders of the FACE Act and the judicial responses to abortion
protest48 argue that such restrictions are necessary to protect abortion
seekers arid providers from physical and emotional injury, and to
vindicatethe constitutional right to choose abortion, which the protests

u.s.c.

43. 18
§§ 1961-1968 (1982).
44. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
45. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803-05 (1994); Pro-Choice Network v.
Schenck, 34 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1994) (invalidating an injunction provision that required
sidewalkcounselors to "cease and desist from such counseling'' upon an indication from the
prospectivecounselee that she did not want to receive such counseling), vacated in part on
reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
46. .The Court in Scheidler did not decide the questions "whether the respondents
conunittedthe requisite predicate acts, and whether the commission of these acts fell into a
pattern." Id. at 806.
·
47. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994); Pro-Choice
Network v. Schenck, 34 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1994) (invalidating an injunction provision that
requiredsidewalk counselors to "cease and desist from such counseling" upon an indication
fromthe prospective counselee that she did not want to receive such counseling), vacated in
part on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260
(1996).
48. See; e.g., Tara K. Kelly, Note, Silencing the Lambs: Restricting the First
Amendment Rights of Abortion Clinic Protestors in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 68
S. CAL.L. REV. 427 (1995).

1370

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70: 1359

threaten to render practically unavailable. 49 By contrast, advocates of
vigorous abortion protest argue that the bulk of the protesters'
activities are constitutionally protected forms of expression 50 or at least
constitute socially valuable political protest. 51 For this reason, protest
should not be chilled by the threat of harsh statutory penalties52 or
enjoined before the expression inherent ·in the protest can occur.53
Factually, both sides appear to be correct. That is, vigorous
abortion protests will most likely burden a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion.54 Laws and j:udicial orders restricting protest
activities in order to reduce that burden will limit some otherwise
protected speech and restrict abortion protesters' ability to convey their
message by their chosen means .55 Thus, the resolution requires an
evaluation and reconciliation of the two constitutional rights and the
social value of nonviolent protest in the context of the particular acts
that the protesters seek to undertake and others seek to limit.
A.

The Right to Choose Abortion

In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held that a
woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy is
fundamental and that any governmental interference with the right
must be justified by a compelling interest.56 The Roe Court held that a
49. See, e.g:, Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, I VA. J. Soc. POL'Y& L. 291, 307 (1994) (noting that a
purpose of the FACE Act is "to ensure that women, who have the theoretical right to
abortion, in fact have access to that right"); Kelly, supra note 48, at 434-40 (detailing the
impacts of abortion protest as limiting the supply of abortion services and adversely.
affecting patients).
50. See, e.g., Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 263 (''The vast majority of
abortion protests are conducted nonviolently and within the bounds of the law ... ,").
51. See, e.g., Hilber, supra note 35, at 170 ("Supporters of the abortion clinic
protesters liken their activity to that of civil rights protesters throughout American history.").
52 . See, e.g., Paulsen & M_cConnell,supra note 23, at 286 (''The sweeping and
overbroad terms of [the FACE Act] would impose severe punishments and create an
enormous chilling effect on entirely lawful (as well as unlawful) public advocacy.").
53. See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First
Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REv.67, 69 (1990) (arguing that the First Amendment should
be interpreted to prohibit injunctions of nonviolent abortion protests).
54. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, supra note 6, at 11 (detailing "how the avowed
purpose" of antiabortion protest activities "is to eliminate access to abortion services").
55. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 81 ("One of our traditions, and one the
courts could legitimately recognize, is that the protestor have his forum and his say and then
be arrested and punished.").
56. 410 U.S. 113, i55 (1973).
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fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and consequently does not independently have
constitutionalrights that compete with those of the woman who bears
it.57 The state, however, has an "important and legitimate interest in
protectingthe potentiality of human life," as well as in "preserving and
protectingthe health .of the pregnant woman." 58 To reconcile these
rights and interests, the Roe Court constructed a trimester framework.
Duringthe first trimester, no state interest justifies interfering with the
woman's decision.59 During the second trimester, protecting the
woman's health may provide a co~pelling interest.60 And during the
third trimester, defined as beginning at the onset of fetal viability, the
state's interest in protecting that potential life could justify complete
prohibition of the procedure, except where necessary to save the
mother'slife.61
fu Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 62
the Court reaffirmed certain aspects of the Roe decision, while
modifyingothers.63 The Court affirmed "the right of the woman to
chooseto have an abortion before viability,"64 and it did not revisit the
question of whether the fetus is a "person" protected by the
Constitution.65 It abandoned Roe's trimester framework, 66 however,
replacing it with a standard that asks whether a governmental

57. Id. at 157-59.
58. Id. at 163.
59. Id. at 164.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 164-66.
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63. A host of decisions between Roe and Casey had hinted that the Court would
reconsiderthe Roe holding, and they cast doubt on the meaning of the right to choose
abortionas well as the trimester framework. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (featuring a majority of the Justices upholding a series of
abortionrestrictionsand questioning the trimester framework);see also Casey, 505 U.S. at
922 (Blackmon,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[l]n Webster . . . four
Membersof this Court appeared poised to 'cas[t] into darkness the hopes and visions of
everywomanin this country' who had come to believe that the Constitution guaranteed her
the rightto reproductivechoice.... All that remained between th.e promise of Roe and the
darknessof the pluralitywas a single, flickering flame. Decisions since Webstergave little
reasonto hopethat this flame would cast much light." (citationsomitted)).
64. Casey,505 U.S. at 846.
65. See id. at 942 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
the Courtin Roe and subsequent cases "assume[d] that what the State is protecting is the
mere'potentialityof human life"').
66. Id. at 873.
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regulation imposed before viability places an undue burden on a
woman's right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.67 The
practical result .of Casey is that states have greater latitude to regulate
the abortion procedure by mandating, for example, that women receive
information about the status of the fetus and options other than
abortion,68 that they wait twenty-four hours between receiving the
information and obtaining the procedure,69 or that they obtain parental
consent if they are underage.70
Casey also reaffirmed Roe's grounding in the substantive.
"liberty" guarantee of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.71 Roe traced a "right of privacy" through a series of
roots,72 ·honing in on personal rights relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.73
Although eschewing reference to a privacy right as such, Casey
affirmed this lineage, noting that because "[t]hese matters[] involv[e]
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [they] are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 74
Certainly, protecting liberty is a crucial part of the explanation of
why the Constitution guarantees the right to choose abortion.75
Standing alone, however, it is insufficient to define the right's scope.
That is, the power.to abort a fetus may be "a 'liberty' in the absolute
sense;'' and even "a liberty of great importance to many women."76
But tpese facts do not demonstrate that it is "a liberty protected by the
Constitution of the United States."77 Locating and justifying a
constitutional "liberty" right requires a balance of a number of
67. Id. at 876-77.
68. Id. at 881-83.
69.. Id. at 885-87.
70. Id. at 899.
71. Id. at 846-53.
72. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that prior to Roe, the Court or individual
Justices had found the privacy right in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the
Fourteenth Amendment).
73. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
74. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
75. See, e.g., id. at 852 ("[Where pregnancy and childbirth are concerned,] the
liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to
the law.").
76. Id. at 950 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. (Scalia,J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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individual has an absolute right not to make certain sacrifices, even if
the sacrifice, to another, would preserve the other's life.82 Yet this
possible interpretation of "liberty" is not the only one. 83 It is, rather, a
social choice, 84 and one that is unclear about whether women ,85 or
anyone, 86 .should want to perpetuate such a choi_ce by defining it as a
constitutional ideal.
Rather than an objection to the sacrifice per se, the objection to
prohibitions or burdensome . restrictions on · abortion is more
appropriately characterized as the 'inequality of the sacrifice

82. Cf McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. 'D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978)
(answeringthe question "in order to save the life of one of its members by the only means
available, may society infringe upon one's absolute right to his 'bodily security' [by
compellingthe donation of bone marrow]"in the negative,and noting that "[f]or our law to
compel [an individual]to submit to an intrusionof his body would change the very concept
and principle upon which our society is founded"), reprinted in DAVIDM. ADAMS,
IN THE LAW551 (2d ed. 1996).
PHILoSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS
83. See, e.g., id. ("Our society,contrary to many others, has as its first principle,the
respect for the individual, and that society and government exist to protect the individual
from being invaded and hurt by another. Many societies adopt a contrary view which has
the individualexistingto serve the society as a whole.").
CHOICES(1985)
84. See generally LAURENCEH. TRIBE, CoNS1TfUTIONAL
(illustrating in a number of different contexts how the Court's constitutional decisions
representchoicesamong a varietyof competingvisionsof constitutionalmeaning).
85. · One strain of feminist thought argues that the "uncaring" state· of the law is a
result of its having been created and interpreted by men, and that injecting female values
into the law would makeit more centeredon relationshipsrather than individualrights. See,
Eouc. 3,
e.g., Leslie Bender,A Lawyer~ Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
31-32 .(l 988) ('Tort law should begin with a premise of responsibilityrather than rights, of
interconnectednessrather than separation, and a priority of safety rather than profit or
efficiency. The masculine voice of rights, autqnomy,and abstractionhas led to a standard
that protects efficiency and profit; the feminine voice can design a tort system that
encouragesbehavior that is caring about others' safety and responsive to others' needs or
hurts, and that attends to human contexts and consequences.'\ But see CATHARINE
MACKINNON,
FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSE
ONLIFEANDLAW39 (1987) ("Women
·value care because men have valued us according to the care we give them, and we could
probablyuse some.");86. Critiques of the no-duty-to-rescuedoctrine abound. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra
note 81, at 251. Many have argued that the constitutionalliberty guarantee should not be
DWORKIN,
TAKING
RIGHTS
understood as simply freedomfrom restraint. See, e.g., RONALD
SERIOUSLY
266-71 (1977) (arguing that if the constitutional liberty guarantee is properly
understood, then there is not an inevitable conflict between equality and liberty, and using
busing as an examplewhere those who desire not to be bussed do not have a constitutional
liberty interest). And as a matter of morality rather than constitutionallaw, others have
arguedthat the obligationsamonghuman beings are broad. See, e.g., Peter Singer,Famine,
Affluence, and Morality, I PHIL
. & PuB. AFFAIRS
229, 230-35 (1972) (arguingthat people in
affluentcountriesare morallyobligatedto care for the less affluent).
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demanded.87 Maybe it would be acceptable for a majority of the
population to decide to,force women to carry conceived embryos to
term if it were willing to impose a similar obligation on men to donate
their body to the· care of others in need. 88 Of course, childbearing is
unique, so it is not possible to posit an exactly analogous m_ale
obligation.89 But perhaps it would be acceptable for~ majority of the
87. See supra note 80 and sources cited therein (arguing that the abortion right is
betterviewedas a question of equality than as one of privacy or liberty).
88. See, e.g., McFall v. Shimp, 10:Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (AlleghenyCounty Ct. 1978)
(denyingequitable relief to compel the only compatiblebone marrow donor to submit to a
transplantto save the life of his blood relative), reprinted in ADAMS, supra note 82, at 551;
DonaldH. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 71 MICH.L. REv. 1569 (1979) (detailing how
UnitedStates law does not require individualsto sacrificetheir bodies to preserve the life of
another and arguing that forced pregnancy and childbearing imposes this type of bodily
sacrifice);Judith J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL.& PuB. AFFAIRS 47 (1971)
(comparingforcedchildbearingto a situation where an individualis involuntarilyhooked up
to a kidney dialysis machine to save the life of an ailing violinist and making the intuitive
argumentthat the individual has the right to unhook himself even though it means that the
violinistwill die).
89. A law requiring all adult citizens to register their blood and bone-marrow types
and to submit to extractionwhen needed to preservethe life of another would seem come
. close. Moreover, it is telling that the government does not impose decidedly lesser
obligationson men for the purpose of saving, or significantlyimprovingthe quality of, other
lives. For example, the governmentcould require adult citizens to give the portion of their
incomenot required for their own sustenance to famine relief, or to serve as mentors for
troubled youth, or to spend some time each day holding·AIDS babies. Although surely
differentfromforced childbearing,each of these requirementsbears some resemblanceto it,
requiringa significantsacrificeof what has traditionally~n conceived as individual liberty
to promotethe well-beingof another.
· The closest requirement that the government sometimes imposes upon men is the
militarydraft. While it used to be possible to argue that the male-only draft served as a
perfectanalog to a necessarilyfemale-onlychildbearingrequirement,the combat restrictions
have been substantiallylifted. To the extent that sex-exclusionfrom the military remains, it
illustrates, rather than justifies, the assumptions about the natural female role that make
restrictionson the abortion choice a violationof equality. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 36
("[L]egalprovisions ensuring that only men are drafted are part of a system of sex role
stereotypingcharacterized by a sharp, legally produced split between the domestic and
public spheres-with women occupying the first and men occupying the second. In tbis
light, legal restrictionson abortion are an element in the legal creation of a domestic sphere
in whichwomenoccupy their traditionalrole, and principallyor exclusivelythat role. Maleonly drafts are part of the legal creation of a public sphere in which men occupy their
traditionalrole, and principallyor exclusivelythat role.'').
Note also that the rewards that accrue for ·rendering the forced service are vastiy
different for childbearing than for military service. Government pays for the period of
militaryservice,providing fringe benefits during and after service. Military service carries
prestige in the social, political, and economic realms, thus often yielding benefits beyond
those that the governmentexplicitly provides. Compare these results to the consequences
sufferedby a woman, often poor to begin with, forced to bear an unwanted child. Try to
imagine a state statute mandating that people who had borne children would receive

to
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population to restrict access to abortion if it were willing to neutralize
the social, economic, and political consequences of pregnancy and
childbirth so that the "cost" in these areas to women forced to carry
fetuses to term were the same as tq all other citizens.90 Quite
obviously, however, American society does not implement this type of
equality.91 Instead, it by and large treats pregnancy and childbearing as
a choice, the costs of which the individual parent is required to bear. It
is this social fact and its consequences for women who bear childrennot the simple biological facts about the nature of pregnancy and

absolute preference in obtaining government jobs and receiving promotions once in them.
Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding such a veteran's
preference against a claim that it violated the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment
because mostly men received the benefit of the preference).
90. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, ReconstrnctingSexualEquality,75 CAL.L. REY.
1279, 1287 (1987) (' The focus of equality [should not be] on the question of whether
women are different, but rather on the question of how the social fact of gender asymmetry
can be dealt with so as to create some symmetry in the lived-out experience of all members
of the community.. .. [According to] this view, the function of equality is to make gender
differences, perceived or actual, costless relative to each other, so that anyone may follow a
male, female, or androgynous lifestyle according to their natural inclination or choice
without being punished for following a female lifestyle or rewarded for following a male
one."); MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 1316 ("If sex equality existed socially-if women
were recognized as persons, sexual aggression were truly deviant, and childrearing were
shared and consistent with a full life rather than at odds with it-the fetus still might not be
considered a person but the question of its political status would be a very different one.").
91. Prior to conception, women lack the same control over their bodies that inen
possess. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 1312 ("Women often do not control the
conditions under which they become pregnant . ... Contraception is inadequate or unsafe or
inaccessible or sadistic or stigmatized. Sex education is often misleading or unavailable or
pushes heterosexual motherhood as an exclusive life possibility and as the point of sex.").
Even assuming a completely desired pregnancy, women experience burdens that men do not
when women choose to have a child. There is no legal requirement that employers pay for
any time that a woman takes off to give birth !Uldimmediately thereafter. California is quite
liberal in mandating a four.month period of unpaid leave during which a woman's job is
guaranteed. CAL. GoVT. CODE § 12945 (b)(2) (West 1992). After childbirth, women
confront a workplace that is structured to reward a lifestyle that does not include primary
childrearing responsibilities, which women disproportionately assume. See MacKinnon,
supra note 79, at 1312-13 ("After childbirth, women tend to be the ones who are primarily
responsible for the intimate care of offspring-their own and those of others. Social custom,
pressure, exclusion from well-paying jobs, the structure of the marketplace, and lack of
adequate daycare have exploited women's commitment to and caring for children and
relegated women to this pursuit which is not even considered an occupation but an
expression of the X chromosome .") ; Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH. L.
REV.797, 822 (1989) (''Western wage labor is premised on an ideal worker with no child
care responsibilities.").
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childbirth92-that justly elevates the liberty to choose abortion to
constitutionalstature.93
The gender equality supplement to the abstract liberty concept
moresolidly grounds the constitutional right to choose abortion in a
numberof respects. First, resting solely on a liberty justification, the
rightto choose abortion is particularly vulnerable94 to the critique that
the existence and scope of privacy rights are a product of judicial
whim.95 The equality focus explains the existence of the right as a
92. Law, supra note 80, at 1016 (''Nature demands that women alone bear the
physicalburdens of pregnancy, but society, through the law, can either mitigate or
exaggerate
the cost of these burdens.").
93. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 79, at 1316-17 ('The legal status of the fetus
cannotbe consideredseparatelyfrom the legal and social status of the woman in whose
bodyit is.... The relation of the woman to the fetus must be seen in the social context of
sexinequalityin which womenhave been kept relativelypowerlesscompared with men.").
94. A constitutional right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in the
constitutionaltext. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ('The Constitution does not
explicitlymention any right of privacy."). Instead, the Court initially found it in the
penumbrassurroundingother constitutionalguarantees. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479,484-85(1965)("[S]pecificguaranteesin the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanationsfrom those guarantees that help give them life and substance. . . . Various
guaranteescreate zones of privacy." (citationomitted)). The Court ultimately attached it to
theFourteenthAmendmentliberty guarantee. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey,505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) ("Constitutionalprotection of the woman's decision to
terminateher pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
... The controllingword in the cases before us is 'liberty."'); Roe, 410 U.S. at
153 (''[We feel that the] right of privacy [is] founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's'
conceptof personalliberty and restrictionsupon state action."). Although substantive due
processhas a pedigree, Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("Although a literal reading of the [Due
Process]Clausemight suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may
deprivepersonsof liberty, for at least 105 years,-. .. the Clause has been understood to
containa substantivecomponent as well .•.. " (citation omitted)); Whitney v. California,
274U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Despite arguments to the contrary
whichhad seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the
FourteenthAmendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure."),
and other constitutionalguaranteesare indeterminateas well, see, e.g., Steven
L. Carter,ConstitutionalAdjudicationand the IndeterminateText: A PreliminaryDefense
of an ImperfectMuddle, 94 YALEL.J.821, 847 (1985) (noting that the constitutionaltext is
"charitably
describedas indeterminate");Barry Friedman,Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91
MICH.L. REV. 577, 649 (1993) ("[11he Constitution . .. presents an easy case on which
thereis widespreadagreement [about its indeterminacy]."),the absence of a more explicit
constitutional
referencehas been perceived to render the privacy/libertyline of due process
casesparticularlysusceptibleto criticism that the constitutionalright depends upon judicial
preferences
. See Sunstein,supra note 80, at 31 (noting that the fact that "the Constitution
doesnot referto privacy"is a "serious difficult[y]" with this constitutionaltheory).
95. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 980-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the
powerof a womanto abort her unborn child" is not "a liberty protected by the Constitution
oftheUnitedStates"in part because "the Constitution says absolutelynothing about it," and
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product of a strong and widely acknowledged constitutional value
independent of the controversial privacy guarantee. It also provides a
more appropriate and consistent means for intetpreting the scope of
the right to choose abortion in particular circumstances than does the
abstract ideal of "liberty."
The variations in the definition of the constitutional right to
choose abortion since its articulation illustrate the need for a solid
constitutional guideline to determine its scope. Decisions after Roe
spoke of "a right to decide whether to have an abortion 'without
interference from the State,'" 96 and intetpreted this requirement quite
strictly.97 Although ostensibly reaffirming the central holding of
further criticizing the majority as "not wish{ing] to be fettered by ... limitations on its
preferences"). The critique that a constitutional right depends upon judicial preferences, in
turn, can undermine the perceived legitimacy of the constitutional decision, Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ('The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (defining the scope of the Due Process Clause "has at times been a
treacherous field for th[e] Court," giving "reason for concern lest the only limits to ...
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of th[e] Court"); Stephen Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Tum, 1992
WIS. L. REv. 679, 704 (noting the problem where "Justices inevitably seem to impose their
. L.
personal values on society"); Owen M. Piss, Foreword: The Fonns of Justice, 93 HARV
REv. l, 12-13 (1979) (opining that judicial interpretation should not rely on "personal
beliefs"), even in the eyes of those sympathetic to broad protection of personal liberties from
governmental intrusion. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (characterizing a
challenge to an antisodomy statute as involving only homosexual sodomy and finding it not
to be a fundamental right) and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (finding no
fundamental liberty interest of biological father to paternal rights where the mother was
married to another man) are two recent cases in which the Court declined to find a
constitutionally protected liberty interest. In both, the dissenters criticized the majority for
interpreting the constitutional guarantee according to its own preferences. See Bowers, 478
U.S. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of "willful blindness" in
failing to see "the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations with others"); Michael H., 491 U.S: at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the plurality's contention that a determination of ''tradition" can eliminate a
situation where "judges ... substitute their own preferences for those of elected officials" as
not being ''the objective boundary that it seeks").
··
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976)).
97 . Compare Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating an informed consent requirement), overruled by Casey,
505 U.S. 833 and Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(Akron i) (same), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 with Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 ("To the
extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the government
requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature
of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, . and the 'probable
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women in abusive relationships. 104 Yet · in the same decision, it
declined to recognize a twenty-four hour waiting period as the same
type of substantial burden for women who increasingly must travel
great distances to have access to the abortion procedure. 105 An explicit
focus on the gender equality value would help to explain and
harmonize these results.
'
Another problem with basing the abortion right solely on a liberty
interest without an equality supplement is that the woman's superior
right to bodily autonomy hinges so crucially upon the determination
that the fetus does not have a competing constitutional right to life.106
Although the Roe Court stated that it "need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins," 107 its decision that the woman, and not
the fetus, holds the constitutional right can be viewed as just that.108
Like the standard used to assess the abortion right, the decision can be
criticized as grounded in judicial preference rather than constitutional
command. 109
Because it provides a different explanation of the values that
underlie a constitutional abortion right, the equality focus addresses the

104. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)
("We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for
their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an
abortion [by a spousal notification requirement] as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion in all cases.").
105. Id. at 886 (finding the 24-hour waiting period not to constitute a substantial
obstacle despite the increased costs .and potential delays it would impose and despite the
district court's finding that "for those women who have the fewest financial resources, those
who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts
to husbands, employers, or others, [the waiting period] will be 'particularly burdensome "' ).
106. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973) ("If th[e] suggestion of [fetal]
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to
life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.").
107. Id. at 159.
108. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court in Roe
and subsequent cases of "begging the question" by "assuming that what the State is
protecting is the mere 'potentiality of human life."').
109. Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of "rattl[ing] off a
collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political
choice") . But see LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, ABORTION: 1)m Cl.ASH OF ABSOLUTES 120-25
(1990) (arguing that the word "person" in the Constitution is most logically read as not
including embryos or fetuses and detailing the wide-ranging legal consequences if the word
were to be read in this way).
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questionof the status of the fetus in a less problematic way.110
Specifically,where the value to be vindicated is equality, the
constitutionalstatus of the fetus is not dispositive. Even were the fetus
a "person"with a right to life, it would not be allowed to demand the
C<H>ptation
of another human body to sustain it.111 Or at least under
theexistingstate of the law, it would not be allowed to do so.112 The
110. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 80, at 42 ("[T]he equality argument ... freely
acknowledgesand, indeed, insists on the strength of the interest in protecting fetal life

....").

111. See, e.g.,"TRIBE,supra note 79, at 1354 ("[T]he law nowhere forces men to
devotetheir bodies and restructur~their lives even in those tragic situations (such as organ
transplants)wherenothing less will permit their children to survive."); Sunstein, supra note
80,at 34 ("[N]o Americanlegislaturehas imposedsuch a duty and ... courts have refused
to do soas well.").
·
112. One counterargumentis that even under the existing state of the law, pregnancy
is differentfrom other hypothetical instances of forced bodily sacrifice because it is the
resultof the voluntary act of engaging in sexual intercourse. Of course, this argument
cannotapply to instances of rape or incest, and loses force where birth control has been
reasonably,although ineffectively,employed. As to the failed birth control example,
imaginea law that required all registereddrivers to assumethe risk that they would be one
of the 5-10%randomlypicked for an organ donation to aid a traffic accident victim. This
type of law, in the current legal environment, would be unthinkable. Yet restrictions on
abortionpremised on the idea that women assume the risk of pregnancy whenever they
engagein sex have exactly the same effect. Even in instances where the sex is ostensibly
voluntaryand birth control not diligently used, the inequality between men and women
remains.The law does not force men to donate parts of their bodies to protect children,
eventhose whom they have fathered. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 41 ("[T]he state's
across-the-boardfailure to impose on men a duty of bodily use to protect children
[constitutes
an unconstitutionalselectivity].").
Another counterargumentis that if the fetus were deemed a person under the
Constitution,
its particularvulnerabilitywould give it an unusuallystrong claim to an equal
rightto life, whichwould require a woman's sacrificeto bring it to term. But this hierarchy
is not what equality currently demands. Men are not required to sacrifice their bodies to
saveotherindividuals,whetherthose individuals,as a class, are unusuallyvulnerableor not.
SeeSunstein,supra note 80, at 42 ("Even if fetuses are a vulnerablegroup, and even if they
areentitledto specialprotectionagainstdiscrimination,they do not have a claim to conscript
bodiesof anothervulnerablegroup on their behalf."). Arguably,the individu.als'very need
forrescuedefinesthe class as particularlyvulnerable,renderingthem indistinguishablefrom
fetusesand highlightingthe selectivityof an argumentthat women alone in the context of
pregnancyare requiredto makethe bodily sacrifice.
A final counterargumentis that abortion represents an affirmativeact of removing a
livingthingfrom a woman's body and therebykilling it, whereasinstancesin which men fail
to makebodilysacrificesconstituteless culpableinstancesof mere inaction. But a view that
placesconstitutionalweight on this differenceassumesmale biology as the natural baseline
whenit is not. Where equality with respectto reproductiveconduct is at issue, the proper
comparison
is betweenits consequencesfor men and women. Because of their biology, men
cansimplyrefrainfrom donating needed bodily materialsto save the fetus that they father.
Women,by contrast,must seek the help of others to obtain an abortion. The equality focus,
however,must remain on what is required to maintain each individual's bodily autonomy,
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equality focus leaves open the possibility that laws could be changed
so that forcing women to carry fetuses to term would not violate the
Constitution by equalizing the sacrifices demanded of woJI1.enand
meri when an innocentlife needs help to be sustained.113
The equality supplement also· has the advantage of adding a
foiward emphas1sto the Court's chosen backward focus in substantive
due process jurisprudence. In deciding whether an asserted interest is
a fundamental liberty right deserving of heightened constitutional
protection, the Court asks whether it is "'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,"' 114 which in tum requires a determinationof whether
protectionof the interest is "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'115 But if the crucial problem with abortion restrictionsis
that they force women into their traditional devalued role,116 then the
focus on traditionrriayreinforceexactly what needs to be overcome.117
At the very least, the doctrinalrequirementforces the Court to strain to
find the abortion right entitled to constitutional protection.118 By
not on the particular nature of the actsrequired to do so. See TRIBE,supra note 79, at 1355
("[There is a] constitutionally problematic subjugation of women in the law's indifferenceto
the biological reality that sometimes requires women, but never men, to resort to abortion if
they are to avoid pregnancy and retain control of their own bodies.").
113. See Sunstein, supra note 79, at 39 n.143 ("No one is likely to be in a good
position to answer" the question whether "an abortion right would necessarily be
unavailable in a world of sexual equality.... Nonetheless, movements 'in the direction of
sexual equality-before, during, and after conception, including after b~questionably
weaken the case for an abortion right by removing one of the factors that supports its
existence.").
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319,325 (1937)).
115. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 188, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see'Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122
(1989) (explaining that to be fundamental, an interest must be one "traditionally protected
by our society").
116. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992)
(Blackmun, ·J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (''Th[e] assumption [of abortion
. restrictions]~hat women can simply be forced to accept the 'natural' status and incidents
of motherhood-appears to rest upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause.").
117. See id. at 896-97 (''There was a time, not so long ago, when a different
understanding of the family and of the Constitution prevailed.... Only one generation has
passed since this Court observed that 'woman is still regarded as the center of home and
family life,' with attendant 'special responsibilities' that precluded full and independent
legal status under the Constitution.... These views, of
are no longer consistent with
our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution." (citation omitted)) .
.118. CompareRoe, 410 U.S. at 129 ("It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the
restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively

course,
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contrast,the constitutionalequality right was born out of a desire to
changethe status quo,119 and particularly in the context of a genderbased differentiation, the Court has interpreted it to condemn
government actions that reflect an "accidental byproduct of a
traditionalway of thinking about females."120 Despite the Court's
imperfectunderstandingof the necessaryscope of this guarantee,121 the
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achieve the same result-equal citizenship. Consequently, where
government actions with respect to pregnancy are at issue, the proper
comparison is between women and men who have engaged in
reproductive behavior. 125 Under this view, additional burdens imposed
on women, just because nature has dictated that they physically bear
the child, violate the ideal of equality.126 · The Supreme Court has
shown itself in some instances to be able .to view the demands of
gender equality in this light. 127 To clarify its understanding and
analysis of the abortion right, it should view it this way as well-that
the abortion right is constitutionally required so long as pregnancy
remains the exclusive instance where the law requires the bodily
sacrificeof one individual to save the life of another.

B. The Free Speech Right
Unlike the abortion right, the right to free speech is explicitly
guaranteed b.Ythe Constitution.1.28 Thus, there is no need to search for
a more fundamental, specifically enumerated right upon which to
ground the guarantee. Still, the right is not self-explanatory. 129 To
operate,government must pass a wide variety of laws that "abridge the
freedom of speech." 130 Because the practical needs of modem
125. TRIBE,supra note 79, at 1584.
126. See id. ("If no man loses his job or his seniority as a result of [engaging in
reproductiveactivity], neither should any woman. A program of pregnancy leave and
benefitsremovesthis inequity.").
127. California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)
(explainingthat the California statute that mandates a four-monthperiod of job security for
womenafter childbirthdoes not violate Title VD's command of equal treatmentof men and
womenbecause "[b]y 'taking pregnancy into account,' California's pregnancy disabilityleavestatuteallows women, as well men, to have familieswithout losing theirjobs").
128. U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
129. Perhapsthe right was intended to protect primarily against government-imposed
prior restraints on speech. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919)
(opinionof Holmes,J.) (''It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom
of speechis not confined to previous restraints,although to prevent them may have been the
mainpurpose. .. .").
.
130. The Court has distinguished between content-based and content-neutral
governmentactions. See Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459
(1994)("[L]awsthat by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on
thebasisof the ideas or views expressedare content-based.... By contrast, laws that confer
benefitsor imposeburdens on speech without referenceto the ideas or views expressed are
in mostinstancescontent-neutral."). Althoughboth have the effect of "abridgingfreedom of
speech,"see Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN.
L. REV. 113, 128 (1981) ("[E]ither [type of] restriction reduces the sum total of
informationor opinion disseminated."),the Court will strictly scrutinize only content-based

as
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government dictate that the provision should not be read literally,131
some definition of its scope is required, which in tum demands an
examination of the values that underpin the free speech guarantee.
Numerous justifications have been offered for the special value
that the Constitution places on freedom of speech.132 These
justifications are primarily utilitarian. That is to say, free speech is
valued not so much as an individual good, but because of the soci.al
goods that flow from it.133 Probably none of the justifications are
exclusive,134 although they necessarily interrelate.135

speech, Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459 ("Our precedents . .. apply the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens
upon speech because of its content. . . . In contrast, regulations · that are unrelated to ·the
content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, ... because in most cases
they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public
dialogue." (citations omitted)). The Court has also distinguished between government
regulation of speech and conduct, applying a lenient balancing test where a government
restriction on conduct has the incidental effect of limiting expression. See, e.g., United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that laws which criminalize draft card
destruction are constitutional even as applied to an individual who burned his card to protest
the Vietnam War).
131. The absolutist view of Justices Black and Douglas has never been embraced by a
majority of the Court. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM
. L. REV. 119,
131-34 (1989) (surveying the many proffered justifications for the free speech guarantee);
Frederick Shauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L REv. 1284, 1284-89 (1983)
(noting that because speech can cause harm equal to actions that the government may
regulate, some explanation for the extraordinary scrutiny of government regulation of speech
is required).
133. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Eanhly Spheres:
TheFragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51
OHIOST. L.J. 89, 114 (1990) ('The core meaning of the constitutional right to speak is
instrumental .... "); Greenawalt, supra note 132, at 130 ("During most of the twentieth
century, consequentialist arguments have dominated the discussion of freedom of speech
.... "); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKEL.J. l,
4 ("[C]ourts that invoke the marketplace model of the first amendment justify free
expression because of the aggregate benefits to society, and not because an individual
speaker receives a particular benefit.").
134. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 132, at 125-27 (arguing that the free speech
guarantee is best explained by reference to "a plurality of values"); Board of Educ. v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-99 (1994) ("It is always appealing to look for a single test, a
Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular
clause .... But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different
contexts. We have, for instance, no one Free Speech Clause test. ... [The different tests]
simply reflect[] the necessary recognition that the interests relevant to the Free Speech
clause inquiry-personal liberty, an informed citizenry, government efficiency, public order,
and so on-are present in different degrees in each context.").
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One common justification for a regime of free speech is that it
results in a marketplace of ideas in which truth is most likely to
emerge.136 Even for those skeptical of the existence, or possibility, of
identifyingobjective truths, 137 the marketplace ideal may be the best
practicalmodel from which socially constructed truths may emerge. 138
This may be so despite defects in people's abilities to communicate,
assess,or understand what is "true." 139 Even apart from the perceived
truth of the speech, other values that freedom of speech may serve
include promoting social stability by providing a public outlet for
numerous competing points of view 140 and promoting tolerance of
differingpoints of view.141

5: For example, the justification that a regime of free speech promotes truth
discoveryrelatesas well to the justificationsthat it aids the proper functioning of democracy
by creatingan active and informed citizenry, and that it promotes individual autonomy,
understanding,
and rationality. See infra text accompanyingnotes 136-139.
136. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) ('Those who won our
independence... believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
meansindispensableto the discoveryand spread of political truth .. .. "); Abrams v. United
States,250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the
powerof the thought to get itself acceptedin the competitionof the market .. . ."); see New
YorkTimes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting a "profound national
commitment
to the principlethat debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
(1859) (articulatingthe "search for
Wide-open").See generally JOHNS. MILL,ON LIBERTY
truth"rationalefor prohibitinggovernmentsuppressionof speech).
137. See Ingber,supra note 133, at 25 ("[A]lmost no one believes in objective truth
today.").
L. REV.971,
138. See KathleenM. Sullivan,ResurrectingFree Speech, 63 FORDHAM
986(1995) ("[E]ven if we were as socially constructed as the new speech critics say, and
evenif the sources of our social construction were readily identifiable, it simply does not
followthatspeechregulationby the governmentwill reconstructus in a better way.").
139. Greenawalt,supra note 132, at 135 ('The critical question is not how well truth
willadvanceabsolutelyin conditionsof freedom but how well it will advance in conditions
of freedomas comparedwith some alternativeset of conditioni;.").
140. See, e.g., THOMAS
I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
7
(1970)("[F]reedomof expressionis a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence a
morestablecommunity.... [T]he process of open discussion promotes greater cohesion in
a societybecausepeople are more ready to accept decisionsthat go against them if they have
a partin the decision-makingprocess. . .. Freedom of expressionthus provides a framework
in whichthe conflictnecessaryto the progress of a societycan take place without destroying
thesociety.");Greenawalt,supra note 132, at 142 ('Though liberty of speech can often be
divisive,it can, by forestalling[the frustration caused when people believe they have been
deniedthe opportunityto present their interests in the political process], also contribute to a
neededdegreeof social stability.").
THETOLERANT
SOCIETY:FREEDOM
OF SPEECH
AND
141. See LEEC. BOLllNGER,
ExrREMISTSPEECH
IN AMERICA
10 (1986) ("[The free speech principle] involves a special
actof carvingout one area of social interaction for extraordinaryself-restraint,the purpose
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Free speech, it is also argued, promotes the system of liberal
democracy, both by exposing abuses of political power 142 and by
enabling citizens to engage in the reflective self-governance that
democracy is supposed to represent. 143 Although under this view the
scope of the right could be limited to speech that involves political
action,144 adding the value of individual self-understanding and
fulfillment 145 expands its scope beyond protection only of speech that
furthers collective self-govemment. 146
of which is to develop and demonstrate ·a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host
of social encounters.").
142. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 521, 528 ("[F]ree expression [can serve the value of] checking the
abuse of official power .... ").
143. • See Af..EXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGoVERNMENT 26 (1948) ("When men govern themselves, it isthey-,-and no one else-who
must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger.... Just so far ·as, at any·
point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or
opinion .. . which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result may be ill-considered . It is
that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment
. . . is directed.").
144. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. l, 27-28 (1971) ("[11he protection of the first amendment .. . must
be cut off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech . ... The notion that all valuable
types of speech must be protected by the first amendment confuses the constitutionality of
laws with their wisdom. · Freedom of non-political speech rests, as does freedom for -other
valuable forms of behavior, upon the enlightenment of society and its elected ·
representatives.").
145. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 132, at 144-45 ("[In addition to promoting
independent judgment and considerate decision,] [t]he practice of free speech enhances the
lives of those who seek to communicate in various other ways. For the speaker,
communication is a crucial way to relate to others; it is also an indispensable outlet for
emotional feelings and a vital aspect of the development of one's personality and ideas. The
willingness of others to listen to what one has to say generates s.elf-respect. Limits on what
people can say curtail all these benefits. If the government declares out of bounds social
opinions that a person firmly holds or wishes to explore, he is likely to suffer frustration and
affront to his sense of dignity." (footnote omitted)); David A.J. Richards, A Theory of Free
Speech, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1837, 1896 (1987) ('The priority of free speech is . ..
coextensive with . . . the communicative independence of willing speakers and audiences
when they are exercising the critical moral powers of the inalienable right to conscience; that
is, they. are engaged in sincere discussion of the facts and values central to the exercise of
our moral powers of rationality and reasonableness .").
..
.146. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 140, at 7 ("[The principle of freedom of
expression] carries beyond the political realm. It embraces the right to participate in the
building of the whole culture, and includes freedom of expression in religion, literature, art,
science, and all of the areas of human learning and knowledge."); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591,604 (1982) ("[D]emocracy is merely a means
to-or, in another sense, a logical outgrowth of-the much broader value of individual selfrealization . .. . Free speech aids all life-affecting decisionmaking, no matter how personally
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Although this individual value is a factor in, ,the Court's
analysis,147 protectionof speechbecause of its potential to contribute to
politicaldiscussion remains primary,148 The Court's core distinction
betweencontent-basedand content-neutral government regulations149
hingeson the public value of speech. Content-based regulations are
''presumptively invalid"150 because they constitute "government
censorship"151 that "may effectivelydrive certain ideas or viewpoints
fromthe marketplace."152 This public focµs is also evident in the few
narrowcategoriesof speech that the Court has identified as exceptions
to the general rule that the government may not regulate speech
becauseof its content.153 Crucial to the Court's line drawing has been
the determinationthat the isolated categories of speech constitute "no
essentialpart of any expositionof ideas" and are·"of such slight social
value" that other societal interests outweigh those of the speaker.154
Content-neutral regulations are less troublesome to the Court.
Therefore,they are subject to less exactingjudicial scrutiny,since they

limited,in much the'same manner in which it aids the political process. [There] thus is no
logicalbasis for distinguishingthe role speech plays in the politicalprocess.").
147. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (''To pennit the
continuedbuilding of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each
individual
; our people are guaranteedthe right to express any thought, free from government
censorship.")
.
148. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
conC\lrring)
("Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position [in the
hierarchy.]").
constitutional
149. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (''.[A]boveall else, the First Amendmentmeans that
governmenthas no power to restrictexpressionbecause of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter,or its content.").
150. R.A.v;, 505 U.S. at 382.
151. Mosley,408 U.S. at 97.
152. R.A.V.,505 U.S. at 387.
153. See,e.g., Simon & Schuster,Inc. v. New York Crime VictimsBd., 502 U.S. 105,
127(1991)(Kennedy,J., concurring)('There are a few legal categories in which contentbasedregulationhas been pennitted or at least contemplated. These include obscenity,see,
e.g.,Millerv. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973), defamation,see, e.g;, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. GreenmossBuilders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), incitement, see, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio,395 U.S. 444 (1969), or situationspresenting some gr~ve and imminent danger the
governmenthas the power to prevent, see, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697,716 (1931).");Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ( 'There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishmentof which have never been thought to raise any Constitutionalproblem; These
includethe lewdand obscene,the profane,the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words
... /' (footnoteomitted)).
154. Chaplinsky,315 U.S. at 572.
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exist for some reason other than their speech content, which
constitutionally renders their effect on public debate less pernicious.
In drawing the various lines used in its free speech analysis, the
Court has used the language of equality. ''There is," the Court has
said, "an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard." 155 Despite
this apparent centrality of equality in free speech analysis,156 the
Court's recognition of the degree to which equality concerns· should
influence First Amendment doctrine remains unduly limited.157 The
Court's subsequent free speech jurisprudence confirms its first
articulation-that the equality important under the First Amendment is
formal equal government treatment.
Except in the limited
circumstances of the established low-value categories, the Court has
been unreceptive to claims that conflicting liberties of different
citizens justify government regulation.
The Court's overly restrictive view of the extent to which the
equality value should influence First Amendment analysis is
particularly evident in its invalidation-on free speech grounds-of
efforts by government to equalize the abilities of various speakers to
communicate their points of view, specifically by attempting to limit
the distorting effect that concentrated wealth has on public debate. 158
155. Mosley, 408 U.'S. at 96 (footnote omitted).
156. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. CHI. L. REV.20 (1975).
· 157. Even where the government does not distinguish on the basis of content;
equality of opportunity to speak can be a concern if a seemingly content-neutral speech
restriction has the effect of abridging certain types of speech disproportionately. See, e.g.,
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Laws which hamper the
free use of some instruments of communication thereby favor competing channels. Thus,
... laws like [the ordinance at issue which prohibited the use of sound amplification
equipment on public streets] can give an overpowering influence to views of owners of
legally favored instruments of communication ... . There are many people who have ideas
that they wish to disseminate but who do not have enough money to own or control
publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places . . ..
[T]ransmission of ideas through public speaking is ... [thus] essential to the sound thinking
of a fully informed citizenry."); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)
("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people."); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 81-86
(1987) (arguing that content-neutral analysis should include the factor of disproportionate
impact); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA.
L. R.Ev.615 (1991) (arguing that cases of disproportionate impact should be analyzed under
the rigorous scrutiny applied to content-based speech restrictions).
158. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978)
(invalidating a state criminal law prohibiting certain expenditures by banks and corporations
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Accordingto the Court, "[T]he concept that government may restrict
thespeech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relativevoice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
whichwas designed 'to secure the widest possible dissemination of
infonnationfrom diverse and antagonistic sources .... "' 159 Under the
Court's view of the meaning of equality, it is most important for the
government to preserve equal opportunity for everyone to speak,
regardlessof. their actual abilities to do so. Where a government
restrictionis at issue, the Court's focus is on the loss of the speech
burdened rather than on the potential social value of the speech
enhancedand preserved.160
This same formal view of equality is apparent in the Court's
evaluationof "hate speech" restrictions. In RA. V. v. City of St. Paul,
the Court further extended the formal treatment requirement, holding
that even within the proscribable category of "fighting words,"
governmentcannot "impose special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects."161 Such government

to influencethe vote on referendum proposals);Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976)

(strikingdownpoliticalcampaignexpenditurelimitations).
159. Buckley,424 U.S. at 48-49.
160. Contrary to the Court's reasoning, government efforts to equalize the speech
opportunities
of all citizens would further the values that underpin the free speech right.
First,the marketplaceof ideas, in order to be a constitutionalideal, must mean something
otherthan a competition of ideas that operates under the same rules as the economic
marketplace.Its point as a metaphor must be that the largest possible range of ideas are
offeredfor sale, not that ideas with relatively small .consumption or those offered by
inefficientmeans are forced to leave the market entirely. Under this view, it is a proper
government
role to preserve the "shelf space" of less richly supported ideas against those
supportedby concentrations of wealth garnered in the economic sphere that would
otherwise
squeezethem out.
Allowingconcentrationsof wealthand power to dominatepoliticaldebate disservesthe
stability-creating
function of the free speech guarantee because the frustration of less
powerfulspeakerswill mount due to the perceptionthat their views are being drowned out.
A regimethat encouragespresentationof a greater range of views also serves the goal of
promoting
tolerancemore than when fewer,well-financedviews can dominate. The same is
trueof the self-governanceand checking values of free expression, since more views are
morelikelyto lead to reflection about the goals and purposes of democracy and critical
evaluationof those in power. Finally, ensured presentation of all points of view aids
individualautonomy and self-understanding by presenting a greater range of ideas,
particularly
values not well-representedin the economic sphere. For all of these reasons,
governmentefforts to lessen the power of accumulated capital on the exchange of ideas
shouldbe compatiblewith the free speechguarantee,not in violationof it.
161. 505 U.S. 377,391 (1992).
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selectivity, according to the Court, poses the "danger of censorship"
and is therefore antithetical to the Constitution. 162
Regardless of the propriety of the particular result, the Court's
emphasis on formal equal treatment as the equality value that
underpins the First Amendment insufficiently recognizes the extent to
which substantive equality concerns should influence the analysis as
well. Proponents of hate speech restrictions agree that equality is a
central First Amendment value, but disagree with the Court's
traditional interpretation of that value. Equality, they argue, is not
always best achieved by limiting government regulation of speech.
Instead, speech such as hate speech effectively silences the speech of
others, who presumptively have an equal right to speak. 163 To those
who would restrict certain types of ractst or sexist speech, the equaiity
value provides the crucial counterweight to the usually assumed value
of unrestricted free speech.164 Therefore, government regulation may
enhance equality by suppressing some speech and thereby allowing all
to contribute to public debate. In certain circumstances, the social
value gained from the preservation of less powerful voices in public
debate will outweigh the social dangers of speech restrictions. The
Court should be open to the many different meanings of equality and
should evaluate in eacp circumstance what type of equality should
define the scope of the free speech guarantee.
In sum, the equality that is central to the First Amendment is in
need of some redefinition. Certainly, equality of government treatment
is an important safeguard against state-imposed censorship that
inhibits the value of robust public dialogue. Sometimes, however, the
requirement of formal equal treatment will not best achieve that goal.
Instead, equality concerns, which also stem from the Constitution,

162. Id. at 395.
•.
163. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He HollersLet Him Go: RegulatingRacist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKEL.J. 431, 468 ("[Racist speech] decreases the total amount
of speech that enters the 'market by coercively silencing members of those groups who are its
targets."); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas Defamationand Discrimination,71
B.U. L. REV. 793, 801 (1991) ("Pornography makes men hostile and aggressive toward
women, and it makes women silent.").
164. MacKinnon, supra note 163, at 806 ('The First Amendment frame on the issue,
taken as exclusive, sees what is said but not what is done [by pornography]. When the
traditions of defamation and discrimination confront each other, the First Amendment
questions how equality can exist without free expression, and the Fourteenth Amendment
questions how expression (or anything else) can ever be free without equality.").
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must temper the absolute rule to lead to the most equitable balance of
individualrights and social good.

C. TheSocial Valueof NonviolentPolitical Protest
Nonviolent political protest, addressing as it does "issues of
public concern [that] occup[y] the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of
FirstAmendment values,"' 165 ordinarily is entitled to First Amendment
protection.166 When such speech activities block access to property, or
constitute independent acts of lawbreaking, 167 such as trespass, the
Constitution no longer shields tpem from government regulation.
Althougha court should look particularly carefully to determine that a
governmentregulation appropriately draws the line between protected
andunprotected protest activities, this determination will constitute the
extent of its review. That is, under the Constitution, government
actorsneed not consider the social value of otherwise prohibitable
nonviolent protest activities in crafting legal restrictions of such
conduct.
Despite this constitutional rule, a certain range of presumptively
proscribable protest activities do indeed have social value. 168
Consistent with many definitions of socially valuable civil
disobedience,169 potentially valuable protest activities 170 are

...

165. Schultzv. Frisby,807 F.2d 1339, 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting,inter_alia,
Careyv.Brown,447 U.S. 455,467 (1980)), rev'd, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
166. NAACPv. ClaiborneHardwareCo., 458 U.S. 886,915 (1982).
167. See, e.g., Ledewitz,supra note 53, at 68 (noting that civil disobedienceis "not
understood
as protectedby the First Amendment").
168. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MAUER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985) ("Americans
acceptthat civil disobediencehas a legitimate if informal place in the political culture of
theircommunity.");
Ledewitz,supra note 53, at 68 ("[C]ivil disobedienceneverthelesshas
becomean establishedpart of Americanpoliticallife.").
169. An importantdistinction exists between direct and indirect civil disobedience.
Directcivildisobedienceoccurs when individualsviolate laws that their consciencesforbid
themto obey. Indirect civil disobedienceoccurs when individuals violate laws that they
believeto be wrong, even though the laws do not directly require or prohibit actions of
individuals
that conflict with their moral beliefs. Abortion protests involve indirect civii
disobedience,
and so referencesin this Articlewill be to this type only.
170. In this discussion,"nonviolentpolitical-protestactivities" refers to conduct that
is proscribablebecause of its affect on the rights of others, such as blocking access to
facilities
, or because it violates preexistinglaws, such as laws against trespass. The latter
constitutes
civildisobedienceor deliberatelawbreaking,whereasthe former may or may not
constitutecivil disobediencedepending upon whether a preexisting law proscribed such
conduct. Despite this potential difference, both types of conduct involve deliberately
infringing
upon the legal rights of others for the purpose of making a political statement.
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nonviolent, 171 openly conducted, 172 motivated by disagreement with.
the law as morally unjust, 173 and engaged in for the purpose of
advertising the law's injustice in order to change it.174
For this reason, observations about the social value and negative social consequences of
civil disobedience apply to both types of conduct referred to in this discussion as
"nonviolent political-protest activities."
171. See, e.g., CARLCOHEN,CIVIl..DISOBEDIENCE:
CoNSCIENCE,
TACTICS,AND1llE
LAw 35-40 (1971) (explaining that civil disobedience is "almost invariably nonviolent in
character''); JOHN RAWLS,A THEORYOF JUSTICE366 (1971) ("[C]ivil disobedience is
nonviolent."); Ernest van den Haag, Disobedience and the Law, 21 RUTGERS
L. REv. 27, 27
(1966) ("Selective resistance to law enforcement without aggressive violence constitutes
civil disobedience .. .. "); Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 70 ("[T]he conduct must be
predominately nonviolent."); Joel H. Levitin, Putting the Government on Trial: The
Necessity Defense and Social Change, 33 WAYNEL. REV. 1221, 1225 n.15 (1987) (stating
that civil disobedience "is usually defined as peaceful, noncompliance with laws"); Barbara
J. Katz, Comment, Civil Disobedience and the First Amendment, 32 UCLA L. REV. 904,
IN
905 (1985) (civil disobedience is "nonviolent protest"). But see CIVn..DISOBEDIENCE
AMERICA25 (David R. Weber ed., 1978) ("Nonviolence ... has by no means always been a
part of civil disobedience.").
172. See, e.g., COHEN,supra note 171, at 39 ("Civil disobedience is an act of protest
... publicly performed."); RAWLS,supra note 171, at 366 ("[C]ivil disobedience is a public
act.");. van den Haag, supra note 171, at 27 ("[C]ivil disobedience [occurs] when a law is
deliberately disobeyed to publicly demonstrate opposition ... to laws or policies of the
government."); Frank M. Johnson, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 44 TuL. L. REv. 1, 6
(1969) (stating that civil disobedience is "an open, i.ntentional violation of a law"); Morris
Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEX. L. REV.507, 508 (1965) ("[T]he act of
civil disobedience [is] . .. an act of deliberate and open violation of law .... "); Ledewitz,
supra note 53, at 71 ("[T]he conduct must be open."): Martha Minow, Breaking the lAw:
Lawyers and Clients Struggle for Social Change, 52 U. Pm. L. REV.723, 733 n.38 (1991)
('"Civil disobedience' is . . . undertaken in a public way."); Sanford J. Rosen, Civil
Disobedience and Other Such Technicalities: Law Making Through Law Breaking, 37 GEO .
WASH. L. REV. 435, 442 (1969) ("Civil disobedience may be defined as open ."); Katz,
supra note 171, at 905 (stating that civil disobedience is "a form of ... public ... protest").
But see MICHAELJ. PERRY,MoRAUTY,Pouncs, ANDLAW 118 (1988) ('The position that
disobedience must be open or public to be legitimate is also untenable.").
173. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 171, at 39 ("Civil disobedience is . ..
conscientiously ... performed ."); RAWLS,suprp note 171, at 364 (explaining that civil
disobedience is "a ... conscientious ... act"); van den Haag, supra note 171, at 27 ("[C]ivil
disobedience [occurs] when a law is deliberately disobeyed to publicly demonstrate
opposition, on moral grounds, to laws or policies of the government.''.); Johnson, supra note
172, at 6 (stating that civil disobedience occurs "under a banner of morality or justice");
Keeton, supra note 172, at 508 ("[T]he act of civil disobedience [is] . . . to protest a
wrong."); Levitin, supra note 171, at 1225 n.15 (suggesting that civil disobedience "is . ..
noncompliance with laws believed to be unjust"); Rosen, supra note 172, at 442 ("Civil
disobedience ... normally is accompanied by the actors' sense of moral indignation and
duty.''); Katz, supra note 171, at 905 (stating that civil disobedience is "a form of
conscientious .•. protest against a law or policy that the actor considers unjust").
174. See, e.g., RAWLS,supra note 171, at 364 (stating that civil disobedience is a
"political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law
ZINN,DISOBEDIENCE
ANDDEMOCRACY
119 (1968)
or policies of the government"); HOWARD
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A great part of the perceived value of nonviolent political protest
comes from retrospective recognition of the salutary legal changes
such activities helped to effect. 175 In the United States, nonviolent
political protest began before the American Revolution with protests
by individual dissenters to perceived violations of the principle of
religious liberty.176 Later, in 1846, Henry David Thoreau spent a night
in jail for refusing to pay the Massachusetts poll tax. 177 Soon after that,
nonviolent protest activities by abolitionists opposed to slavery in
general, and specifically to laws that required nonslaveowners to
facilitate the apprehension of fugitive slaves, 178 became widespread. 179
In 1873, Susan B. Anthony was convicted of illegally voting, an act
she and a number of other women undertook pursuant to a conviction
(asserting that civil disobedience is "the deliberate, discriminate violation of law for a vital
social purpose") ; van den Haag, supra note 171, at 27 ("Selective resistance to law
enforcement .. . constitutes civil disobedience, when a law is deliberately disobeyed to
publicly demonstrate opposition . . . to laws or policies of the government."); Keeton, supra
note 172, at 508 ("[T]he act of civil disobedience [is] ... an act of deliberate and open
violation of law with the intent, within the framework of the prevailing form of government ,
to protest a wrong or to accomplish some betterment in the society."); Ledewitz, supra note
protestor must intend that the community take notice of the illegal
53, at 71 nnhe
action."); Levitin, supra note 171, at 1225 n.15 (explaining that civil disobedience "is
usually defined as peaceful, noncompliance with laws believed to be unjust in an effort to
change them"); Rosen, supra note 172, at 442 ("Civil disobedience .. . is politically
motivated.").
175. It is not possible to demonstrate a direct link between civil disobedience and
legal change. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 84 ("No one can show that civil
disobedience actually hastened the end of segregation, helped win women the vote, or
helped bring an end to the Vietnam War."). It is possible, however, to say that positions
advocated and publicized by civil disobedients have come to be accepted as correct
interpretations of justice worthy of being embodied in law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.amends .
XIII, XIV, XV (abolishing slavery and granting African-Americans full rights of
citizenship); id. amend. XIX ('The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."); see also
DWORKIN,supra note 168, at 105 ("Few Americans now either deplore or regret the civil
rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s.").
176. See, e.g., CIVILDISOBEDIENCE
IN AMERICA,supra note 171, at 20 ("American
civil disobedience begins . . . with resistance to specifically religious persecution or
harassment .. .. ").
177. See THOREAU
: PEOPLE,PRINCil'LES,ANDPOLITICS35 (Milton Meltzer ed.,
1%3).
178. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, § 5, 9 Stat. 462
(repealed 1864), "commanded [all good citizens] to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient
execution of th[e] law, whenever their services may be required."
179. See, e.g., ROBERTM. COVER,JUSTICEACCUSED:ANTISLAVERY
ANDTHEJUDICIAL
PROCESS175-91 (1975) (chronicling the activities of the abolitionists and the judicial
The Jurisprudence of Civil
response); Matthew Lippman, Liberating the Law:
Disobedience and Resistance, 2 SANDIEGOJUST.J. 299, 317-28 (1994) (same).
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that the current judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
was wrong and that the constitutional provision, in fact, authorized
them to vote. 1so More recently; nonviolent protest was the bulwark of
the civil rights movement, with individuals sitting in at lunch counters,
taking freedom rides, and otherwise trespassing and breaking laws
they claimed unjustly enforced racial segregation. 1s 1 Those protesting
the United States' arguably illegal involvement in the Vietnam War
also used nonviolent protest extensively.1s2
These historical circumstances suggest that nonviolent political
protest has been a crucial tool for politically less powerful minorities
to bring their views of justice to the consciousness of the majority who
has the power to make the law.1s3 The social value of nonviolent
political protest is thus akin to the social value of free speech. 184 Its
value is the primarily instrumental one of promoting full and robust
political dialogue. 185 It is this communicative aspect that makes
180. See CIVII..DISOBEDIENCEIN
AMERICA,
supra note 171, at 184-85.
181. See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 179, at 328-41 (chronicling the civil disobedience
of the civil rights movement and the judicial response).
182. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that
the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not immunize a draft card burner from
criminal prosecution).
'
183. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982)
('Through speech, assembly, and petition-rather
than through riot or revolutionpetitioners sought to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second-class
citizens.").
184. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 171, at 366 ("One may compare [civil
disobedience] to public speech, and being a form of address, an expression of profound and
conscientious political conviction .. .. "); Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 122-23 ("[Civil
disobedience] illustrates depth of commitment by the minority-a factor the majority should
wish to consider in setting policy. [Civil disobedience] grabs the attention of the majority,
thus promoting debate and lessening public apathy. Because of these communicative
aspects, civil disobedience should be viewed as speech."); David F. Freeman, Note, Press
Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering on °PrivateProperty, 84 COLUM.L. REV. 1298, 1342
(1984) ("[C]ivil disobedience is a particularly powerful form [of symbolic speech].").
185. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 142, at 640 ('The kind of stimulus necessary to
activate the political conscience of a privately oriented populace sometimes can be created
only by transcending rationality and appealing to more primitive, more basic instincts.");
Shelton L. Leader, Free Speech and the Advocacy of Illegal Action in Law and Political
Theory, 82 COLUM.L. REv 412, 420-25 (1982) (arguing that civil disobedience has an
educative function in a political system rooted in a social contract because society may learn
of a breach only by resistance to questionable laws); David A.J. Richards, Rights,
Resistance, and the Demands of Self-Respect, 32 EMORY L.J. 405, 433 (1983) ("[T]he
arguments of civil disobedience often . .. motivate constitutional elaboration of values
. ... "); Karl S. Coplan, Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment
Context, 84 COLUM.L. REv. 144, 171 (1984) ('The communication of one's refusal to
comply with a law fits within the framework of preferred political expression. Civil
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nonviolent political protest valuable and distinguishes it from any
other presumptively proscribable conduct. 186
The analogy between the social values of free speech an~
presumptively proscribable political-protest activities raises the
question of whether the legal system should treat such acts differently
from otherwise similar conduct. 187 Although some argue that those
who deliberately 'violate the rights of others or break the law to make a
political statem~nt deserve no punishment for their lawbreaking, 188 this
position stands in great tension to the structure of our constitutional
democracy and the national con:nmtment to the rule of law.189 That is,

disobedience is ariimportant part of the lawmaking and self-government process."). But see
Lippman, supra note 179, at 306 ("Judges' condemnatory comments towards civil
disobedients are particularly paradoxical in light of the American historical heritage . . . . A
promirient place in the American hagiarchy has been preserved for 'the rebel' and the
themes of individuality and freedom have been central in the United States' legal
theology.").
,
186. See, e.g., Peter M. Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of
"Speech", 1993 WIS. L. REv. 1525, 1586 (differentiating "ordinary violations of law" from
"disobedience [that is] communicative"); Carolyn Grose, Note, "Put Your Body on the
Line": Civil Disobedience and lnjunctio~, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1497, 1522 (1994) ("[T]he
importance of civil disobedience sterns from its symbolic expression of protest."); Joel A
Youngblood, Note, NOW v. Scheidler: The First Amendment Falls Victim to RICO, 30
T'UI.sA
L.J. 195, 212 (1994) (stating that civil disobedience is a "form[] of expression which
[is] crucial to the maintenance of our societal fabric.").
187. The expressive value of civil disobedience is not the only reason why actors
within the legal system might, or perhaps should, decide to consider the reason for the
lawbreaking in evaluating its sanction. Direct civil disobedience involves violation by an
individual of a law that he cannot, consistent with his conscience, comply with. The reason
. for not punishing, or punishing less severely, such lawbreaking may relate more to
preserving individual integrity than to disseminating speech about the law. Indirect civil
disobedience involves violation oflaws that do not directly act upon the individual violator.
For this type of civil disobedience, its expressive function is crucial to its social value.
188. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT,CONFLICTSOF LAW AND MORAUIY 271-81 (1987)
(discussing this point of view); Steven M. Bauer & Peter J. Eckerstrom, Note, The State
Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 1173, 1174-77 (1987) (discussing applicability of the necessity defense to acts of
civil disobedience); Paul R. Davis & William C. Davis, Civil Disobedience and Abortion
Protests: The Casefor Amending Criminal Trespass Statutes, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. Ennes &
Pua. PoL'Y 995, 1011-12 (1991) (arguing that criminal trespass laws should be revised to
exclude nonviolent abortion protests); Debbe A Levin, Note, Necessity as a Defense to a
Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. REV . 501, 508-10 (1979)
(discussing abortion protesters' claims that the necessity defense should apply to their
actions).
189. See United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Md. 1968) ("No
civiliz.ednation can endure where a citizen can select what law he would obey because of his
moral or religious belief. It matters not how worthy his motives may be. It is axiomatic that
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absent a constitutional prohibition, the majority is allowed to decide
what the rules will be and whether to enforce them- · in the interests of
peace, order, and stability-against the minority of individuals who do
not like the law but whose views did not prevail in the political
process. 190 Allowing nonviolent political protesters to intrude upon the
legal rights of others or to break preexisting laws with impunity would
upset this majority privilege and undermine the democratic
structure.191 For this reason, definitions of socially valuable civil
disobedience often contain the requirement that the actors should
accept the lawful punishment for their actions.192
Where the protesters arewilling to accept legal punishment for
their actions, they can be said to be acting within, rather than outside
. of, the democratic structure.193 Where their acts are intended to
chaos would exist if an individual were permitted to impose his beliefs upon others and
invoke justification in a court to excuse his transgression of a duly-enacted law.").
190. See, e.g., RAWLS,supra note 171, at 363 ("[The question of when civil
disobedience is justified] involves the nature and limits of majority rule.'') .
IN AMERICA,
supra note 171, at 21 ('Throughout
191. See, e.g., CNIL DISOBEDIENCE
much of our history ... the advocates of civil disobedience have been accused of holding
principles that lead straight to disorder, anarchy, or subversion .... ").
192. See, e.g., RAWLS,supra note 171, at 367 ("[Civil disobedience] expresses
disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the outer edge
thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the public and nonviolent
nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one's conduct.''
(footnote omitted)); Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 71 ("[T]he protestor must be willing to
accept punishment.''); Johnson, supra note 172, at 6 (arguing that a civil disobedient must
be "willing to accept punishment for the violation"); Minow, supra note 172, at 733 n.38
(asserting that civil disobedience is usually defined to include "a willingness to accept
official sanction"); Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 188, at 1189-94 (summarizing the
reasons that have been advanced as to why willingness to accept punishment is a necessary
element of civil disobedience).
Some argue that civil disobedience requires only a willingness to accept the risk of
punishment, so that advancing a defense of necessity at trial does not negate the civilly
disobedient character of the conduct. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 172, at 455; Bauer &
Eckerstrom, supra note 188, at 1191; Michael L. Kessler, Note, AntinuclearDemonstrations
and the NecessityDefense: State v. Warshow, 5 VT.L. REV.103, 108 & n.27 (1980). But
see Carl Cohen, Civil Disobedienceand the Law, 21 RUTGERS
L. REV. I, 6 (arguing that
civil disobedient actors must be willing to accept punishment to be a "sacrifice").
I 93. See, e.g., RAWLS,supra note 171, at 365-66 ("It is assumed that in a reasonably
just democratic regime there is a public conception of justice by reference to which citizens
regulate their political affairs and interpret the constitution. The persistent and deliberate
violation of the basic principles of this conception over any extended period of time,
especially the infringement of the fundamental equal liberties, invites either submission or
resistance. By engaging in civil disobedience a minority forces the majority to consider
whether it wishes to have its actions construed in this way, or whether, in view of the
common sense of justice, it wishes to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the minority.").
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persuade the majority that the judgments reached through the political
process are wrong, the fact that punishment exists-and that the
protesters are willing to accept it-becomes a powerful part of the
expression that the civil disobedience represents.194 Their acts of
protest, combined with the hardships they will suffer thereafter,
illustrate to the majority the depth of their commitment, and thereby
render their acts of protest a unique means of conveying their
message.195
Several threshold requirements significantly narrow the scope of
political-protest activities ~ntitled to respect as important additions to
the democratic process. Activities carried out secretly do not have the
expressive weight that comes from a willingness to accept the
punishment that the democratic ·system has decreed.196 In addition,
with public activities, it is important to distinguish between those
genuinely intended to inform or persuade and those intended to change
the law by other means, such as raising the economic cost of a societal
commitment to the challenged activity, thereby changing the societal
commitment for reasons other than the moral wisdom of the policy.197
Truly expressive protest activities thus have social value that
should impact legal judgments about those activities. Removing all
punishment, however, would detract from the valuable expression that
194. See, e.g., id. at 367 ("We must pay a certain price to convince others that our
actions have, in our carefully considered view, a sufficient moral basis in the political
convictionsof the community.").
195. See, e.g., CharlesR. DiSalvo,Abortion and Consensus: The Futility of Speech,
the Power of Disobedience, 48 WASH.& LEEL. REv.219,226 (1991) ("Civil disobedience
can move people when argumentationand exhortation fail. But not all disobedience is so
capable. Only civil disobediencethat is characterized by sacrificial,redemptive, suffering
[whichincludes willingly acceptingpunishment]is effective.");Ledewitz,supra note 53, at
122-23 ("[The minority's depth of commitment is] a factor the majority should wish to
consider in setting policy. [Civil disobedience] grabs the attention of the majority, thus
promotingdebate and lesseningpublic apathy.").
196. See RAWLS,supra note 171, at 366 ("[Civil disobedience] is not covert .or
secretive.").
197. Abortion protest activities specifically designed to overburden and incapacitate
local. law enforcementfall within this category. See, e.g., State Report-Vermont: Pro-Lifers
ABORTION
REP.,May 8, 1990, available
"Clog Vermont Courts", 1990 AM.POL NE1WORK
in Westlaw,ALLNEWSdatabase,5/8/90 APN-AB 6 (quoting Felicity Barringerof the New
York Times describing the '"plan of attack developed by Operation Rescue in Atlanta in
1988 and since expanded elsewhere: first block the clinics, then clog the courts"'); Max
Boot, Race Is On for Injunctions As Operation Rescue Starts Offensive Against Clinics, THE
CHRISflAN
SCI. MONITOR,
July 9, 1993, at l (quoting a pro-choice activist as saying,
'There's been a deliberateattemptby Operation Rescue to flood courts and overwhelmlocal
law enforcement.... ").
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REsOLUTION OF TIIE SCOPE OF TIIE R.IGIITSIN TIIE CON1EXT OF
PARTICULAR PR01EST ACTIVITIES

A.

Isolatingthe Assumptionsthat Underliethe FACEAct and StateCourtInjunctionsagainstAbortionProtests

The crux of the dilemma with respect to regulating abortion
.clinicprotests lies in the middle of two relatively undisputed extremes.
At one extreme end of the range of abortion protest activities is
violence directed at persons or property.199 Even most defenders of
vigorous abortion protest agree that such actions may, consistent with
the Constitution and respect for civil disobedience, ~ declared
unlawful and punished.200 At the other end of the spectrum is
nonviolent expressive conduct that does not block access to clinics or
otherwise break the law, which is conceded by both sides of the
abortion issue to be presumptively protected from government
regulation.201
Most of the FACE Act prohibitions fall within the first extreme.
The FACE Act imposes its penalties and civil remedies upon
[w]hoever . . . by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,
intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to
injure, intimidate or interfere with any 'person because that person is or
has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or
any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health
services; ... or intentionally damages or destroys the property of a

199. The murders of abortion practitioners and the firebombing of abortion clinics are
extreme examples within this extreme. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, supra note 6, at 3-7
·
(detailing the violence directed against health care personnel and facilities).
200. See, e.g., Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 262 ("[N]o one is entitled to
violate the rights of others by trespass, assault, violence, or threat of violence, . merely
because they are acting in pursuit of a cause that may be just."). But see S. REP.No. 117,
supra note 6, at 4 (quoting Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 6, 1992, at 170, and describing an Operation
Rescue coordinator who testified that "there [is] a legitimate use of force on behalf of the
unborn [as an ethical question]," including "destroy[ing] . . . abortion facilities" and
"terminat[ing] an abortionist").
201. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(l) (1994) ("Nothing in this section shall . be
construed . .. to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other
peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the
Constitution."). Injunctions establishing "buffer zones" around clinics restrict nonviolent
expressive conduct, but only because of previous prohibitable conduct engaged in by the
protesters. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994)
('The state court seems to have had few other options to protect access .... ").

1402

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70: 1359

facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility provides
reproductivehealth services.202
The prohibitions against the use of force or threat of force, and
intentional injury of a person or damage or destruction of facility
property, or attempts to do the same, are widely acknowledged not to,
include presumptively protected protest activities.203 Moreover,~
response to testimony on the proposed bills, the FACE Act defines
"intimidate" as "plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of
bodily harm to him- or herself or to another."204 This definition locates
the proscribed conduct in the concededly regulable range.205
The remaining portion of the FACE Act that potentially falls
within the contested middle ground is that which · prohibits..
"interfer[ing] with any person" who seeks or has sought an abortion.
The Act defines "interfere with" to mean "to restrict a person's
freedom of movement."206 This definition addresses critics' concerns
that the term could prohibit mere speech without a physical
obstruction.207 What the Act still prohibits, however, are nonviolent
activities208 that have the effect of restricting the freedom of movement
of health care providers or those seeking their services. These may be
of several types. They may be activities already illegal under state law,
in which case the FACE Act authorizes federal courts to grant
injunctions and enhances the retrospective sanctions. They may also
be acts not previously illegal but which have the effect of blocking
202. 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(l), (3) (1994).
203. Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 267 (''We do not contend that the terms
'force or threat of force,' 'injure,' or 'damage or destroy the property' are vague or
overbroad.").
204. 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3) (1994).
205. See Paulsen & M;cConnell,supra note 23, at 271, 275 (criticizing the undefined
use of the term "intimidate" because it "would unconstitutionally permit a violation to be
based on the subjective reaction of abortion clinic patrons and personnel to anti-abortion
speech" but acknowledging that "the state may punish actual assaults or physical
interferences placing a person in reasonable apprehension of irrunediate bodily harm").
206. 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(2) (1994).
207. See, e.g., Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 275 (noting that a state had
used a statute with language prohibiting "interfer[ence] with the lawful taking of wildlife by
another person" to prosecute someone who spoke to duck hunters about the violence and
cruelty of hunting).
208. Arguably, any act of ''physical obstruction" that "interfere[s] with" people by
"restrict[ing their] freedom of movement" contains some element of violence. The FACE
Act, however, clearly indicates that it applies to ''nonviolent physical obstruction." 18
U.S.C. § 248(b)(2) (1994). Thus, "violent" conduct appears to refer to conduct that
constitutes or threatens physical injury.
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clinic access. fu this case, the FACE Act provides a new ground for
injunctive relief and retrospective punishment. Although not detailed
in the FACE Act, examples of such nonviolent obstruction would
include protesters locking themselves to clinic doors,209 parking cars so
as to obstruct entrance to a clinic,210 and linking arms so as not to
allow staff or patients to pass through.
State law supplements the FACE Act restrictions, potentially
providing the basis for injunctions against a broader variety of protest
activities than those prohibited by the FACE Act. To the extent that
the activities involve violence.or threatened violence against people or
property, such injunctions reach concededly regulable conduct in the
same way as the FACE Act prohibitions.211 These injunctions,
however, may also apply to peaceful protest activities.. They may
apply to nonviolent lawbreaking, primarily trespass or harassment,
whose illegality under generally applicable state laws justifies the
injunction.212 They may also apply to acts that are not otherwise
illegal, either because of previous violent activities engaged in by
some of the abortion protesters or because previous protest activities
had the effect of harassipg abortion seekers213 or providers214 or
blocking access to clinic facilities.215
209. Kelly, supra note 48, at 429 n.3 (noting how the Lambs of Christ, a pro-life
group, have gained notoriety for protest activities, including chaining their necks to clinic
doors with kryptonite bike locks).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Lucero, 895 E Supp. 1419, 1420 (D. Kan. 1995)
(stating that protesters welded themselves inside vehicles parked to block clinic access).
211. This is true even though the standard of review of legislation and an injunction
would differ slightly. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524
(1994) (''We believe that these differences .[between an injunction and a generally applicable
ordinance] require a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment
principles in th[e] context [of an injunction].").
212. Boot, supra note 197, at 1 ("Based on trespassing and harassment laws," a
number of state judges have issued injunctions limiting Operation Rescue protests."):
213. See, e.g., Madsen, 114 S. 0. at 2528 (upholding morning ban of "singing,
chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification
equipment or other sounds . .. within earshot of the patients inside the [c]linic").
214. See, e.g., Matthew Bowers, Anti-Abonion Tactics Cut Availability Across U.S.,
TuE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Sept. 1, 1994, at B4 ("[At a Florida clinic] [p]rotesters
followed one ... doctor[] 160 miles to his home. The children of other doctors have been
followed to school. Someone called one doctor's 82-year-old mother and said he had died
in a traffic accident, and two weeks later called him and similarly said his son had been
injured.").
215. See, e.g., Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2527 ("We also bear in mind the fact that the
state court originally issued a much narrower injunction, providing no buffer zone, and that
this order did not succeed in protecting access to the clinic.").
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Both the FACE Act and state-court injunctions against abortion
protests evidence several threshold assumptions, which in tum raise
several issues. The first issue is whether the law should distinguish
and treat differently certain acts of nonviolent protest because of their
social value. Resolution of this issue requires looking beyond the
question of whether the Constitution requires such consideration to the
broader question of whether, and in what circumstances, the social
value of such protest activities should temper sanctions as a policy
matter. The second issue is whether the Constitution forbids
injunctions against "harassing" or "intimidating" conduct that does not
necessarily result in or threaten physical injury. Resolution of this
issue requires a determination of what constitutes injuring,
prohibitable conduct as opposed to protected expression or valuable
political protest.216

B.

NonviolentProtestActivitiesthat BlockAccess to Abortion
Facilitiesor ConstituteTrespasses

Both the FACE Act and state-court injunctions render illegal
nonviolent protest activities that block access to abortion clinics.
State-law injunctions also prohibit nonviolent protest activities on
other grounds, most frequently as trespass.217 Where a law prohibits
conduct, rather than expression, and there are apparently valid
non.speech-related reasons for the restriction, the First Amendment
will not privilege such cor~ductfrom regulation just because the actor
216. See Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 89-90 ("Undeniably,pro-life protests proceed
through harassment. 'Harassment' is an appropriate term even for those, like myself, who
sympathize with the tactics of these protests. The major tactic of such protests-legal or
not-is to shame or disturb women seeking abortions so that they change their minds.
Naturally,the resulting pain to pregnant women, including the women who go ahead with
the abortion, is resented by pro-choice advocates.");Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23,
at 263 ('Those who seek abortions have no constitutionalright to be spared the indignity
and distress of learning that many of their fellow citizens consider the act of abortion
tantamountto murder.").
217. See Allison v. City ofBirmingham, 580 So. 2d 1377, 1381-82 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991) (citing numerous cases where abortion protesters were charged with criminaltrespass
and the courts rejected the necessity defense); Cecilia E. Cantrill et al., A Survey of
Developmenisin Maryland law, 1983-84,44 Mo. L. REV.439, 449 n.71 (same); Davis &
Davis, supra note 188, at 955-56 (arguing that "the activities of Operation Rescue make
evident the need to qualify the legitimate rights protected by criminal trespass statutes");
Levin, supra note 188, at 515 (noting. that "[a]bortion clinic trespass is used as another
weapon in the anti-abortionists' fight to end legal abortions" and analyzing the necessity
defenseto such charges).
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intended to express an idea.218 Restricting protest activities to ensure
clinic access comports with the Constitution,219 as does enforcement of
laws against trespass.220
Although the constitutional balance authorizes legislators and
judges to prohibit acts o( nonviolent abortion protest that block access
to abortion facilities or that constitute trespasses, the fact remains that
such activities may constitute nonviolent protest that has recognized
social value. This apparent contradiction raises the question of
whether and how the social value of such activities should enter into
legal judgments even apart from a constitutional mandate that such
value be considered. This question is particularly acute because
injunctions issued pursuant to the FACE Act or any state law and the
FACE Act retrospective penalties will usually impose greater burdens
on such activities than state-law retrospective sanctions. These
additional burdens that the FACE Act and state-law injunctions
impose on such nonviolent protest activities raise several subissues
within the general question of how the law should treat them. First,
should abortion protests, or at least certain types of abortion protest
activities, be less susceptible to injunction because of their social
value? Second, should the fact that certain abortion protest activities
218. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that a conduct
regulation that incidentally prohibits symbolic speech is valid "if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers · an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is. no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest'').
219. See Madsen, 114 S. 0. at 2527 (upholding a 36-foot buffer zone as "a means of
protecting unfettered ingress to and egress·from the clinic"); United States v. Brock, 863 F.
Supp. 851, 858 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("When a message is conveyed through an activity that
'bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to •.. distribute information or opinion,' the
government may proscribe that activity notwithstanding the impact on the message....
Thus, courts have generally held that messages delivered via physical obstruction, like
messages delivered through the use or threat of force, are not protected under the First
Amendment." (citations omitted)).
220 . · See Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 7 6 F. Supp. 1156, 1165 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(citing cases where courts rejected abortion protesters' claimed right to trespass), aff'd sub
nom. Armes v. Doe, 897 F.2d 520 (3d Cir. 1990); Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil
Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REv.805, 839 (1990) ('The right to exclude others is a fundamental
element of private property ownership, and the first amendment does not create a right to
trespass on private property." (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972)));
Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 67-68 ("Civil disobedience ... is expressive conduct even the
participants admit is not protected by the First Amendment. The classic example of civil
disobedience-a sit-in-is conduct the government has traditionally prohibited." (footnote
omitted)).
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constitute potentially valuable protest render unwise the imposition of
enhanced retrospective sanctions? This section will address these
questions in tum.
1.

The Propriety of Injunctive Relief

(

Because both injunctive relief and legislation providing f~
retrospective sanctions deter nonviolent protest by attaching a cost to
the activities, both will potentially result in the loss of socially valuable
protest activities. Nevertheless, injunctions are likely to result in a
greater loss of protest activities because they are more likely to stop
nonviolent protest than is the threatened imposition of generally
applicable retroactive sanctions.221 This is so because the sanctions for
violating an injunction are likely to be more swift,222 sure,2~ and
severe224 than those for ordinary nonviolent lawbreaking. If the
injunction effectively stops the protest activities, then the protesters'
expression occurs only in the context of the injunction hearing. By
contrast, absent an injunction, protesters are more likely to decide to
accept the normally low punishment for nonviolent lawbreaking,
garnering significantly more media225 and public attention226 from the
221. Of course, it is not at all clear that an injunction will have its intended effect.
See, e.g., "Bambi" Fugitive Seiz.ed, Sr. PETERSBURG
TIMES,Oct. 18, 1990, at 7A ("Leaders
of the anti-abortiongroup Operation Rescue burned a court order on the steps of the U.S.
Courthouse . .. accusing the judge who signed it of violating their constitutional rights.'');
GLOBE,
Efrain Hernandez,Jr., 16 Abortion Protesters Arrested in Brookline, THEBOSTON
Sept. 9, 1992, at 47 ("[A] spokeswomanfor Operation Rescue in Boston said members of
the group will continue nonviolent protest to prevent abortions, including actions that
violate [an] injunction.").
222. Contempt proceedings usually involve fewer issues than criminal trials and so
happen more quickly after the lawbreakingand take less time to complete.
223. Once an injunction has been properly issued, the guilt issue in many
jurisdictions is whether the protesters violatedits tenns, not its proprietyas an initial matter.
SeeWalker v. City of Birmingham,388 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1967) (holding valid a state-law
rule that the unconstitutionalityof a court order is no defense in a contempt proceeding).
But see In re Berry,436 P.2d 273, 282 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting argumentthat petitioners may
not raise constitutionalobjections to the court's order because the Californiarule is that "an
order void upon its face cannot support a contemptjudgment").
224. Contempt sanctions are usually more severe than the penalties for nonviolent
lawbreaking,and because of the personal nature of an injunction,both with respect to those
enjoined and the issuing judge, imposition of the penalty is more likely. See Ledewitz,
supra note 53, at 100-09 (detailing a number of differences between an injunction and a
crime).
225. See, e.g., Pat Schneider,Panel Debates Limits on Abortion Clinic Protests, THE
CAPITAL
TIMES,June 25, 1994, at 3A (quoting Dr. Dennis Christensen, medical director of
the Madison Abortion Clinic, as saying, ''What the [clinic] demonstrationsare really about
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act of lawbreaking and the subsequent trial than they would from an
injunction hearing alone.227
These additional burdens that injunctions impose on protest
activities require going beyond the question of whether the
Constitution allows them to be restricted at all,228 to the question of
whether, as a matter of social policy, some types of restrictions are
more appropriate than others. As detailed earlier, nonviolent abortion
protest is socially valuable to the extent that it constitutes political
expression intended to persuade the public majority that its judgments
about abortion are morally wrong:229 This quali~cation significantly
narrows the scope of abortion protest activities entitled to special
consideration in making or applying the law.
Many of the abortion protest tactics are acknowledged by the
participants not to be intended as persuasive, but rather to halt
abortions by other means.230 Most violent activities, like killings,
physical violence, arson, bombings, and other acts of property
destruction fall within this category.231 Their purpose is to physically
is garnering media attention and contributions," and "[t]hey go where they get the most
attention" and that he hopes "that federal jurisdiction will help 'shut down the traveling road
show."').
·
226. Lawbreaking usually involves significantly more contact with the general public
than courtroom hearings.
227. Because pre-trial injunction hearings are usually less thorough than criminal
trials, injunctions lessen protesters' opportunities for expression of their views in the
courtroom. See, e.g., Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 117 ('The political theater of the
courtroom is an important aspect of civil disobedience itself."); Carol McGraw, Abortion
Protest Cases May Swamp Courts, L.A. TIMES,Oct. 3, 1989, §2, at I ("Members of
[Operation Rescue] ... have found that they can effectively use the courts as a pulpit for
their cause. In short, they demand trials.").
228. Abortion protesters subject to injunctions have challenged them on numerous
specific grounds. Many relate to the terms of particular injunctions. The Supreme Court
recently rejected a more all-encompassing ground that injunctions against abortion
protesters constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. See Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994) ('That petitioners [subject to the challenged
injunction] all share the same viewpoint regarding abortion does not in itself demonstrate
that some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated the issuance of the
order.").
229. See supra notes 165-198 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., S. REP.No. 117, supra note 6, at 11 (detailing how the avowed purpose
of much antiabortion protest is to eliminate access to abortion services, and quoting the field
director of Operation Rescue National as declaring, "We may not get laws changed or be
able to change people's minds, * * * [b]ut if there is no one willing to conduct abortions,
there are no abortions.").
231. See, e.g., RAWLS,supra note 171, at 366 ("To engage in violent acts likely to
injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address."). Evi::n if
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stop access to abortion, not to convince people through reasoned
argument or even emotional appeals that abortion is a morally wrong
choice.232 The same is true of much of the nonviolent abortion protest
act1v1t1es. Although the actual motives are undoubtedly mixed,233
many of the "rescue" tactics appear primarily functional .rather than
persuasive.234 They are designed to close down abortion facilities by
force, not by changing public opinions.235 This may or may not be a
wise tactical judgment, given the apparent lack of effect of persuasive
strategies on public opinion.236 But even wise tactics to achieve an
they are intended 'as expression, the high social costs of the conduct justify regulation. See,
e.g., Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (''The
Court rejects as insupportable any suggestion that shootings, arson, death threats, vandalism,
or other violent and destructive acts addressed by FACE are protected by the first
amendment merely because those engaged in such conduct "'intend[] thereby to express an
idea."'" (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) (quoting United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968)))).
232. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, supra note 6, at 11 (''The express purpose of the
violent and threatening activity described [in this report] is to deny women access to safe
and legal abortion services. Anti-abortion activists have made it plain that this conduct is
part of a deliberate campaign to eliminate access by closing clinics and intimidating
doctors.").
233. See, e.g., Arlene D. Boxerman, The Use of the Necessity Defense by Abortion
Clinic Protesters, 81 J. CRIM. L . & CRIMINOLOGY
677, 696 (1990) ("[O]pposition to
government's current abortion policy lies at the root of virtually all abortion clinic
demonstrations, even those demonstrations conducted by individuals who claim to have
only non-political goals. . . . Unlike most political protesters, however, abortion-clinic
trespassers do have an immediately realizable, non-political goal as well: they seek to
prevent individual abortions, which they view as murders."); Davis & Davis, supra note
188, at 1010 (noting that Operation Rescue's goals are to stop individual abortions and to
change public opinion).
234. See Davis & Davis, supra note 188, at 1010 (stating that Operation Rescue's
founder Randall Terry "indicates the short-term goal of Operation Rescue as stopping as
many abortions as a direct result of the 'rescues' as possible, and the long-term goal as being
a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion" (citing THENEWAM., Nov. 7, 1988, at
20)).
235 ." While "rescuers" may "hope . . . to -dissuade women from seeking a clinic's
abortion services and . . . to impress upon members of society the moral righteousness and
intensity of their anti-abortion views," NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488
(E.D. Va. 1989), aff 'd, 914 F.2d 5821 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), their blockade tactics constitute "a
final expression of [their] case" and are therefore not respectfully expressive, see RAWLS,
supra note 171, at 366; see also DiSalvo, supra note 195, at 225 ("Operation Rescue's
failure to recognize the existence of pro-choice moral claims is to treat the opponent without
respect, as alien to the debate, as 'other.' By contrast, recognizing the existence of others'
claims (as distinct from recognizing their validity) would cause the public to view Operation
Rescue as a reasonable endeavor and to listen more attentively and sympathetically to its
claims.").
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extralegal aim are not entitled to special consideration in a
constitutional democracy. Only to the extent that activities are
genuinely expressive do they have social value that serves as a
counterweight to the presumptively antisocial effect of lawbreaking.
Where acts of protest are genuinely expressive according to the
conditions described above, their loss should be a factor in deciding
whether injunctions against them are appropriate. This would be a
change for courts that currently draw a stark line between expression
protected by the First Amendment and lawbreaking that is not.237 That
is, where the conduct at issue is an act of political protest designed to
engage the public in debate, courts should not issue injunctions as
readily as they would for. any other type of threatened unlawful
conduct. Instead, there should be a middle ground whereby courts
weigh the expressive value of nonviolent lawbreaking in deciding if
the injunction is warranted.238
Another factor in the injunction balancing test, however, must
continue to be the effect of the lawbreaking on the rights of other
individuals.239 Physical blockades or trespasses that burden access to
abortion services obviously affect a woman's right to choose
abortion.240 To determine the propriety of injunctive relief, it is thus
necessary to evaluate the scope of the respect for genuine political
protest against the scope of the right to choose abortion. It is in the

236. See DiSalvo, supra note 195, at 223-32 (detailing the reasons for Operation
Rescue's lack of persuasiveness and arguing that continued violent and obstructive conduct
would be an unwise strategy).
237. See, e.g., NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1497 (''[l]njunctive relief must not abridge
defendants' First Amendment rights to express their abortion views in an appropriate
manner in the vicinity of abortion clinics. At the same time, however, the defendants may
not use the First Amendment as an excuse to engage in unlawful conduct or to infringe a
person's right of access to an abortion clinic.").
238. The tests for issuing both preliminary and permanent injunctions require a
balancing of the equities between the parties and a determination of where the public interest
lies. See NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1496 (granting permanent injunction). Either of these
prongs of the tests could include consideration of the expressive value of civil disobedience.
Mahoney v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 89-3136-00, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69, at
*4 ·(D.D.C. Jan. 8, 1990) (granting preliminary injunction (citing, inter alia, Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921,925 (D.C. Cir. 1958))).
239. The hardship on the party seeking the injunction is a factor in the court's
balance.
240. See S. REP.No. 117, supra note 6, at 14 ("By making clinics inaccessible to
patients and staff alike, blockades and invasions deprive people of needed health care
services.").
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interest of a healthy democracy to accommodate both of these
interests.
When these interests are viewed as liberties (or liceils~
vindicating primarily individual interests, they appear to clash. 241It \s .
only when they are viewed in light of their functional values in
representative democracy that the conflict lessens. A focus on the core
values that underlie the constitutional right to choose abortion and the
societal respect for some acts of nonviolent protest can reconcile
them.242
The social value that supports some degree of respect for
nonviolent protest activities comes from the fact that potentially
persuasive communication occurs between the individual protesters
and the majority of citizens who have chosen the state of the law. The
individual protesters presumptively had a say in the political process
equal to all other citizens. Respect for protest activities recognizes the
potential fallibility of a judgment reached even through the democratic
process. 243To the extent that governmental actors modify the reach of
the law because of the expressive nature of the lawbreaking, it
enhances the opportunity of the dissenters to convince the majority
that its policy judgments are misguided, thus effectively giving the
protesters another opportunity to participate in public debate.
Although this opportunity is undoubtedly of value to the individual
speakers, the social value stems from the fact that the speakers
augment, and potentially change, public dialogue and judgments about
an important issue of social policy.

a

241. See DWORK1N, supra note 86, at 266-71 (rejecting a concept of "liberty as
license" meaning "the absence of constraints placed by government upon what a man might
do if he wants to" and noting that "[i]n this ... all embracing sense of liberty as license,
liberty and equality are plainly in competition").
242. See id. at 268 ("I should want to claim .. . that people have a right to equality in
a much stronger sense [than a right to liberty as license to act as they please without
government restraint], that they do not simply want equality but that they are entitled to it,
and I would therefore not recognize the claim that some men and women want liberty as
requiring any compromise in the efforts that I believe are necessary to give other men and
women the equality to which they are entitled.").
243. Abortion protesters primarily target the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution, which is arguably distinguishable from a democratic decision. This fact
perhaps enhances their claim to engage in nonviolent protest. Nevertheless, the fact that the
interpretation is of the Constitution, which has a democratic pedigree, and that the Justices,
who engage in interpretation; were put into place by elected officials, diminishes the
significance of the distinction.
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This understanding of the social value of protest activities leads
to a qualification within the group of expressive protest activities
entitled to special legal consideration. Nonviolent abortion protest
conduct falls into. two general categories-activities like sit-ins,
picketing, prayer vigils which are designed to communicate with the
public generally, sidewalk counseling, and other one-on-one
communications which are designed to dissuade particular individuals
from seeking or performing abortion services. An examination of the
nature of the values that underpin respect for nonviolent protest and
the constitutional right to choose abortion reveals that only abortion
protests aimed at the majority in general are entitled to special
consideration in the injunction inquiry.
Because the social value that supports limited respect for
nonviolent protest is that of dissenting individuals as held against the
majority, allowing a protester to break the law or significantly intrude
on individual rights for the purpose of communicating with
specifically targeted . individuals about their private choices in
particular circumstances does not further this social value in the same
way as a publicly directed communication about public policy. This
holds true despite the fact that one-on-one communications may serve
other important interests, for example, ensuring that individual
decisions are fully informed.244 The question is not whether these
results are valuable in the a}?stract,but whether the value added to
constitutional democracy by the protest activities justifies to some
extent overlooking their negative effects.
Abortion protest activities have both public and private effects.
The deleterious effects to the public come from the social and
economic costs of tolerating any deliberate lawbreaking. Their impact
is spread among the individual members of society. The adverse
private effects, by contrast, are heavily concentrated on the targeted
individuals. They are not abstract, like a change in the social attitude
about respect for law, but are concrete, and include monetary loss,
psychological wear and tear, and possible physical injury. Even in the
context of constitutionally protected expression, the Supreme Court
has recognized such specific expressions as more subject to regulation
244. Davis & Davis, supra note 188, at 1023 (arguing that the benefits of clinic
trespasses "derive from enabling Operation Rescue participants (or anyone else) to provide
information detailing the pros and/or cons of abortion (or any practical health choice) to
persons so that a decision can be made on a more fully informed basis").
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because the communicators "do not seek to disseminate a message to
the general public, but to intrude upon [a] targeted individual ." 245 To
the extent that the protest activities constitute lawbreaking before an
injunction, a societal judgment has been made that the costs of such
activities are such that citizens as individuals are not required to bear
those costs alone. That the affected individuals seek an injunction
against the conduct evidences a specific judgment that they perceive
the costs of the conduct to outweigh any benefits that they might
receive.
Because the private value of even expressive protest activities is
low and their private costs are so great, or at least so disproportionate
to what other members of society .are required to bear, a justification
for considering the value of nonviolent protest activities in the
injunction inquiry that relies on the value to private individuals fails.
The justification for such consideration must depend upon their value
to the public at large. As noted above, when the expression is directed
at public policy, this value does indeed exist and inheres in the unique
form of communication of expressive protest activities and the
political discussion that they may engender. So, the range of protest
activities potentially subject to special consideration in the· injunction
inquiry includes only that which is .directed at the public at large and
challenges public policy generally rather than directed at specific
members of the public as a challenge to their individual private
choices.
Even with the category of abortion protest activities entitled to
special treatment in the injunction inquiry so narrowed, the question
remains whether factoring the social value of such protest activities
into the injunction inquiry is consistent with the constitutional right to
choose abortion. The equality interest that underpins the right to
choose abortion is that bet~een pregnant women who do not choose to

245. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,487 (1988). Although the Court in Frisbywas
speaking in the context of intrusions upon private residences, the Court has since made this
distinction with respect to picketing targeted at particular individuals outside of an abortion
clinic. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994) ("We have
noted a distinction between the type of focused picketing banned from the buffer zone and
the type of generally disseminated communication that cannot be completely banned in
public places, such as handbillingand solicitation." (citing Frisby,487 U.S. at 486)).
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Although the value of publicly directed expressive abortion
protest is significant enough to outweigh its generally diffused costs,
including the costs on abortion seekers and providers of receiving the
message of the protest, a more difficult question is whether the public
value of such protest activities outweighs the other private costs that
may occur even when the protest activities are not targeted at specific
individuals. These private costs are particularly evident where
abortion protests occur at abortion clinics. The costs ·Of nonviolent
physical blockades to abortion providers include the fees lost or
incurred because of a delay in abortion services, or because of patients
deterred from entering on the day of the protest or later, as well as the
cost of repairing any damage to the premises or in seeking to hold the
protesters responsible for their actions. For the abortion seekers, the
costs include: the psychological trauma and potential adverse health
effects either of delay in obtaining abortion services or of enduring the
protest activities during the particularly vulnerable time before and
after undergoing a medical procedure; the increased costs, both in
terms of money and convenience; and the negative reactions of third
parties, of returning for services, if necessary. As a matter of equal
citizenship, everyone is required to put up with some degree of cost
and inconvenience to further the value of free expression. That these
costs exist, however, and are concentrated on particular individuals,
indicates that the boundaries of consideration for the value of
expressive protest in the injunction inquiry should be drawn with the
purpose of minimizing these private impacts.
Once the social value of presumptively enjoinable abortion
protests has been narrowed to expressions aimed at the majority at
large which are designed to add to political debate, it becomes
apparent that a number of limitations on the degree of special
consideration would accommodate both the societal interest in free
discussion and the private interests in access to abortion services. As
an initial matter, the potentially high private costs of clinic protests
should prompt inquiry as to why the activities must occur at that
location. That is, a court should look closely at whether the "public
message" threshold requirement for special consideration for
otherwise enjoinable abortion protest activities is met. fu the abstract,
it is difficult to imagine why the public message of abortion protest
depends upon its occurring at a clinic site. fu most cases, the
protesters' message would seem to be as effectively delivered by
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blockading or trespassing at city hall, a major thoroughfare, or the
Supreme Court. In these situations, the choice of a clinic as the
location for protest would appear directed at maximizing the private
effects. If this is the case, then the abortion protest activities should be
entitled to no special injunction consideration. There may, however,
be special circumstances under which a court could find that a clinic
location for abortion protest activities heightens or clarifies the public
message or effect. In this situation, other limitations on the protest
activities could accommodate their social value as well as the right to
choose abortion.
·
No matter where if occurs, · the strength of the message as
expression would seem t9 depend primarily on its being said and
received, not on its being said and received continuously. Where
abortion protest impacts private rights adversely, such activities should
be limited in timeframe. This means that individual abortion seekers
and providers must suffer some hardship and inconvenience, like
anyone else in the nation who chooses to participate in a controversial
activity. But the limited timeframe of protest would limit the impact
on particular individuals.
In addition, the expressive value of protest would seem to be
aided, rather than impeded, by publicizing the times and duration of
nonviolent protest. So, for example, a court could enjoin even
peacefulprotests during certain hours of the day or during certain days
of the week. Publicizing these restrictions through an.injunctive order
would permit maximum attention on the protests, while allowing those
seeking abortions to work around the protest activities.
Because of the private costs involved, an injunction inquiry
should also be sensitive to the fact that certain individuals or facilities
are not disproportionately chosen as sites for nonviolent lawbreaking.
Limiting the duration of protest at any specific site would not seem to
impact significantly on the communicative value of the protests, which
would be better served. by changing locations frequently so as to
spread the message more broadly. Again, there may be special
circumstances in which prolonged protest at one site significantly
augments the message. In such cases, courts should be particularly
sensitive to the heightened private costs as well.
With these considerations in mind, courts can fashion inlunctiom,
th.atbest balance the social value of nonviolent abortion \)IOtest and the
consututiona\ right to obtain abortion services. These considerations
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center around the important recognition-largely absent from current
legislation and judicial injunction decisions-that a court should be
particularly wary of enjoining nonviolent protest activities that are
designed to communicate a political message to the public at large.
Preserving a place for nonviolent protest of existing laws is important
not only to the current dissenters, but to the majority, which should be
constantly questioning the wisdom of its policies, and to those who
may dissent from other majoritarian decisions in the future.
2.

The Propriety of Enhanced Sanctions for Political Protest

Although.the practical effect of injunctions may be to increase the
penalties that nonviolent protesters are likely to suffer for their
\a~breiling;4 9 the "Fl\..03.A.ct cioesso exp'\icitly. The A.ct generally
authorizes fines of $15,ooo ·or one-year jail tenns, or both, for first ·
violations and $25,000 or three-year jail terms, or both, for subsequent
violations.250 Although the Act reduces the fines for "nonviolent
physical obstruction," the fines are still substantial-$10,000 or six
months, or both, for first violations and $25,000 or 18 months, or both,
for subsequent violations.251 It also authorizes private civil actions for
fees and damages according to proof or in a statutory amount of
$5,000 per violation.252 The FACE . Act thus authorizes fines,
imprisonment, and damages greater than the typical state-law penalties
for such actions.253 Because of its effect, the FACE Act raises a
question beyond whether the nonviolent activities of abortion
protesters · should ·be punished like any other illegal act to whether
enhanced penalties for such politically motivated conduct is
appropriate.
Critics have challenged the cons_titutionalityof the FACE Act on
numerous grounds,254 including most frequently that its provisions are
249 . See supra note 224 and accompanying text (noting how the effect of an
injunction is to convert ordinary lawbreaking into contempt of court, for which the penalties
are usually higher).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 248(b) (1994). If bodily injury results, the Act authorizes
imprisonment of up to ten years, and if death results, it authorizes an unlimited term. Id.
251. Id;
252. Id. .§ 248(c)(l) (1994).
253. See S. REP.No. 117, supra note 6, at 20 ("Another problem with reliance on
State and local laws is that the penalties for violations of these laws are often so low as to
,
provide little if any deterrent effect.").
254. See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (addressing claims that
(1) Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Qause to enact the FACE Act;
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premised on unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.255 Lower
courts, however, · have resolved these claims in favor of the
constitutionality of the FACE Act.256 Evaluation of these court's
analyses is beyond the scope of this Article.257 Instead, the focus here
is on the question untouched in these judicial decisions because the
congressional decision appears to have resolved it-whether the social
value of nonviolent abortion protest activities, specifically nonviolent

(2) under the First Amendment, the Act is vague, overbroad, and effectuates viewpoint
discrimination; (3) content-discrimination is protected by the First Amendment; (4) the
FACE ·Act violates the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2()()()bb-4(1994); and (5) the FACE Act imposes excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 861 n.19 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
('The defendants also argue that FACE's obstruction provisions discriminate based on
viewpoint. . They argue FACE targets messages on one side of the 'reproductive health
services' debate, i.e., anti-abortion messages."); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 702 (D.
Ariz. 1994) (''Plaintiffs next contend that FACE is
impermissible viewpoint-based ban on
speech because it discriminates only against anti-abortion expression.''); Council for Life
Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (''Plaintiffs further contend that
· FACE imposes content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on protected expression ...
because it singles out for special punishment acts committed in the course of anti-abortion
protests}').
.
The FACE Act does not apply exclusively to activities that interfere with access to
health care services.· After testimony on the proposed bill, it was amended so that the final
statute also contains a prohibition against interference with the exercise of "the First
. Amendment right of religious freedom at a -place of religious worship." · 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(a)(2) (1994). This may not, however, solve critics' objections. See .Paulsen &
McConnell, supra note 23, at 287 ("While the religious liberty amendment is thus a
welcome and desirable change, we are not persuaded that it is sufficient to overcome the
objection that the biU selectively targets pro-life advocacy on the basis of the viewpoint
being expressed.").
256. See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995); Woodall v. Reno, 47
F.3d 656,658 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); American Life League, Inc. v.
Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 652 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lucero; 895 F. Supp. 1419, 1420
(D. Kan. 1995); United States v. Hill, 893 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (N.D. Aa . 1994); United
States v. Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1286, 1297-98 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 76 F.3d 913 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 867 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Riely v. Reno,
860 F. Supp. 693, 709 (D. Ariz. 1994); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1009 (W.D. La.
1994); United States v. Wilson, No. 94-Cr-140, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20063, at *24-*25
(E.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 1994), dismissed,880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th
Cir. 1995), petitionfor cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3669 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1996) (No. 95-1523);
Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856F. Supp. 1422, 1431-32 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
257 . Other conunentators have addressed this topic: .See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein,

an

Rules of Engagementfor Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, UnprotectedSpeech, and
ProtectedExpressionin Anti-AbortionProtests,29 U.C. DAVJSL.REv. (forthcoming 1996).
·'
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physical blockages258 or trespasses, should affect the wisdom of
enhancing the sanctions for engaging in them.259
The analysis of injunctions distinguished first between protest
acts that were expressive as opposed to functional, and then between
the expressive acts directed at the public at large as opposed to targeted
at specific individuals.260 With the question of enhanced sanctions,
these distinctions are again appropriate. The reason to hesitate to
impose enhanced sanctions on acts of nonviolent protest would be the
same as that which would prompt hesitation to enjoin the conduct
before it occurs-that enhanced sanctions strike the wrong balance,
chilling valuable activity too severely.261 But this social value of the
protest activities occurs only when it is primarily expressiv~.262
Although some social value exists when the expressive conduct is
directed at particular individuals, the increased and highly
concentrated effects of such targeted protests outweigh their value. 263
. Thus, again, only the range of nonviolent protest activities that are
designed to communicate a political message to the majority at large
should be candidates for special consideration in setting sanctions.
Viewed in the context of the entire scope of activities generally
prohibited by the FACE Act, the restriction on the limited rangenonviolent lawbreaking intended to communicate a political message
to the · public at large-may appear incidental and presumptively

258. Cf.Brock, 863 F. Supp. at 859 (distinguishing nonviolent physical blockages for
the purpose of constitutional analysis: "[T]he government and amici make a strong
argument that, under the relevant case law, the defendants' actions in blockading the clinic
are simply not entitled to First Amendment protection. I did not hesitate to apply such a
categorical approach to the use of force or threats of force.. . . l do hesitate, however, to
apply it to nonviolent 'physical obstruction."' (citation omitted)).
'
259. See, e.g., Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 262-63 ("The proposed
[FACE Act] should . . . be of grave concern to those who value our heritage of fair play
toward political protests. . .. [T]he penalties required under [the FACE Act] are
excessive. . . . Constitutional questions aside, members of Congress should think deeply
about the injustice of imposing so severe a sanction on a person who has acted peacefully
and out of conscience."); Schneider, supra note 225, at 3A (noting that a political science
professor on the panel was "concerned about the [FACE Act's] potential impact on the
nation's tradition of civil disobedience because of its severe penalties for nonviolent
obstruction").
260. See supra notes 230-245 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
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justified by the harms threatened by the other prohibited activities. 264
When this pocket of activities is isolated, however, the different
treatment of minority political protesters and members of the majority
who break laws for other reasons becomes obvious and the
justification less apparent. The different treatment is even more acute
given that the justification for the enhanced punishment is inversely
proportionate to the amount of the enhancement. That is, the least
harmful acts of lawbreaking receive the most greatly increased
punishment under the FACE Act as compared to what the prior
penalty for such lawbreaking would likely be.265
The values that underlie both th<: right to choose abortion and
respect for nonviolent protest suggest that, for this limited range of
nonviolent protest, enhanced sanctions are inappropriate. When the
activities are nonviolent and publicly expressive, their social value is at
its peak, and the social costs are at their lowest. It is in this context
that limited consideration of the social value of such conduct is most
appropriate and serves the value of providing more equal voices for all
members of the citizenry. Enhanced sanctions stifle_public debate.
Weighing on the other side of the balance are the costs that
individual abortion seekers and providers will suffer even when the
scope of protest activities potentially immune from enhanced sarictions
is limited. As noted above in the discussion of injunctions, individual
hardships might in particular cases lead to injunctions against
otherwise socially valuable political protest. 266 But this balance will
not obtain in every case. Rather, the result will differ according to the
particular activities and hardships at issue.
By contrast, the FACE Act enhances sanctions for such protest
activities across the board. The nature of these costs, however,
suggeststhat they are not certain or severe enough to justify the FACE
Act's blanket imposition of enhanced sanctions. This fact is especially
true where an alternate means to protect individual interests is

r

264. See, e.g., Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 704 (D. Ariz. 1994) ("[Even if the
FACE Act impinged on constitutionally protected speech or expressive activity,] given
Congress' findings as to the need for protecting those seeking or providing abortion
services,the [FACE Act] restrictions on . . . speech would be 'incidental to their antiabortionmessage' and, therefore, pennissible.").
265. Even though the FACE Act provides lesser penalties for "nonviolent physical
obstruction," 18 U.S.C. § 247(b), (c)(2)(B) (1994), these penalties are still a greater
enhancementthan that for violent activities.
266. See supra text and accompanying notes 247-248.
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available. A better choice in the·context of valuable protest activities
than the FACE Act sanctions would be a middle ground, where only
injunctions would be authorized beyond the other preexisting
punishments. This alternative would preserve the ability of courts to
make individualized determinations of hardship, thus, in effect,
imposing the .equivalent of enhanced sanctions only in cases where the
circum,stanceschange the presumed balance of values.
Eschewing enhanced sanctions for nonviolent publicly expressive
protest is consistent with the equality value that underlies the right to
choose abortion as well. This right is threatened when social rules
impose burdens on pregnant women that other citizens do not have to
bear. Usually, allowing the protest activities outlined above will not
impose disproportionatecosts on pregnant women. Where it does, the
alternative of an injunction issued after a particularized inquiry is
available.
Also weighing against the hardships that individual abortion
seekers or providers will suffer in any particular case is their interest as
citizens in free and full public debate. Abortion rights are in part the
legacy of protesters who brought the unjust treatment of women into
public debate. Who knows when these individuals will again need
such a channel of expression to promote ideals of equality? Moreover,
~t is in the context of the Jeast socially harmful protest activities that
FACE Act critics' charge of discriminatory treatment of only certain
types of protesters is truly disturbing.267 Although under current case
law, it may not rise to the level of a constitutional defect with the
statute, those in support of abortion rights should be concerned about
this treatment as a matter of equality. The specter of the majority
choosing and heavily peQalizingdisfavored protesters should justify at
least some costs on abortion seekers and providers to preserve the
· American ideal of equal ·opportunityfor nonviolent expressive protest
for everyone.
C.

TheDefinitionof "Injury" vs. ProtectedExpression

Although · the FACE Act defines the offense of intimidating
health care seekers or providers to require a reasonable apprehension
267. See Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 282 ("Abortion protestors are not
the only political protestors to obstruct others in an attempt to intimidate or prevent them
from exercising their legal rights, but they would be the only ones singled out for special
punishments as a matter of federal Jaw.").
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of bodily harm,.~ threat of physical injury has not defined the outside
scope of state-law injunctions or regulations against abortion protest.
Instead, governmental entities have sought to regulate, and courts have
been asked to enjoin, a variety of protest activities that do not directly
threaten physical injury on the ground that they constitute
"intimidation" or "harassment." Several factual accounts illustrate the
nature of these activities.
In one case, plaintiff Planned Parenthood sought to enjoin the
following activities, which it characterized as "intimidating and
harassing":
[T]hrusting lurid literature at the patients : .. , accusing patients and
staff of being 'baby killers' and 'murderers' . : . ,· attempting to
intimidate patients into abandoning their planned abortions . . . ·,
chanting so loudly as to interfere with .the operation of the clinic [,] . . . ·
shov[ing] plastic replicas of fetuses into the faces and cars of Planned
Parenthood patients and staff[,] ... .persist[ing] in following patjents,
shoving leaflets at them and harassing them despite patients' frequent
requests that the protesters leave them alone.268

In another suit, because of an atmosphere that allegedly
"'intimidated' women patients," a clinic sought an injunction
''forbidding the use of such terms as 'kill,' 'murder,' and 'butcher.'"~69
Another court described how "peaceful [sidewalk] counseling, when
conducted in the compressed space at the entrances of medical
facilities, often erupts into a charged encounter between 'sidewalk
counselors,' patients and patient escorts":
During these encounters, "sidewalk counselors" often become angry
and frustrated when patients and patient escorts persist in entering the
clinics.
The "counselors" then tum to harassing, badgering, .
intimidating and yelling at the patients and patient escorts in order to
dissuade them from entering. They continue to do so even after the
patients signal their desire to be left alone. The "sidewalk counselors"
often crowd around patients, invade their personal space and raise their
voices to a loud and disturbing level. At times, the voices of "sidewalk
counselors" can be heard inside the health care facilities, thereby
disturbing the quiet environment necessary for provid~g_ safe and

268. Planned Parenthood v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 f. Supp. 617, 620
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
.
269. Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir.
1989).
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efficacioushealth care. Some "counselors"have even used bullhorns
to reachpatientswho have alreadyenteredthe clinics.270
Other activities that .courts have confronted include identifying
and calling abortion seekers and providers by name/ 71 videotaping
patients and their license plates,272 and protesting at abortion providers'
homes, with pickets and chanting that include the target's name. 273
Courts have struggled with whether and to what extent
injunctions or regulations to protect abortion seekers and providers
from such "intimidation" or "harassment" by abortion protesters are
appropriate. Advocates of a broad scope of freedom for abortion
protesters argue that "no citizen has the right to insulate herself from
the opinions of others, however traumatic or offensive those opinions
may be to her" and that "making a violation [of law] turn on the sense
of affront, ·embarrassment, annoyance, intimidation, or chagrin
experienced by the pregnant woman who encounters pro-life pickets
270. Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1425 (W.D.N.Y.
1992),ajf'd sub.nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated
in part on reh'g en bane; 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted; 116 S. Ct.
1260 (1996).
271. See, e.g., Operation Rescue v. .Womep'sHealth Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 668
(Aa. 1993) ("No picketer can force speech into the captive ear of the unwilling and
disabled."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
114 S, Ct. 2516 (1994); see also Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2536 (Scalia, J., concuning in part
and dissenting in part) (describing a videotape of the abortion protest activities at issue as
follows: 'The camera focuses on a woman who faces the clinic and, hands cupped over her
mouth, shouts the following: 'Be not deceived: God is not mocked. . .. Ed Windle, God's
judgment is on you, and if you don't repent, He will strike you dead. The baby's blood
flowed over your hands, Ed Windle.... You will burn in hell, Ed Windle, if you don't
repent."').
272. Pro-Choice Network, 199 F: Supp. at 1426 ("[Contrary to defendants' claim that
video cameras were "used solely for defensive purposes"], the evidence clearly shows that
defendantsuse cameras as offensive we11ponsto hara~s and intimidate patients entering the
clinics. Defendantshave even pointed the cameras directly into the faces of patients seeking
access to the clinics. They have also videotaped patient vehicles and their license plates as
they enter the medical facilities. Defendants are well aware that women seeking abortions,
especially younger women, are often tenified at the prospect of anyone, especially family
members, finding out that they are having an abortion, and that the presence of cameras
increases patients' fear that their identities might be revealed."), ajf'd sub nom. Pro-Choice
Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated in pan on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d
377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. a. 1260 (1996).
273. See, e.g., Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1340-41 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing
acts at a doctor's home that included tying red ribbons to the bushes and door of the house,
carrying signs that said "baby killer," shouting "Baby Killer, Dr. Victoria, you're a killer,
save our children," and telling children in the neighborhood that the doctor killed babies),
rev'd, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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or sidewalk counselors as she is preparing to abort her fetus or unborn
child ... is plainly unconstitutional." 274 They defend "forceful[] ...
face-to-face" speech,275 such as shouts of "baby killer" directed at
individual women "by large crowds of people milling around" 276 and
the aggressive activities of "sidewalk counselors." ·
By contrast, those in favor of limits on abortion protest
emphasize the effects of such strident and invasive activities on
abortion seekers and providers. The trauma of confronting such
protesters may make the abortion procedure more hazardous in a
number of ways277 and increase the recovery time from the procedure.
It may cause both patients and providers to suffer emotional strain and
distress, which may in tum cause prospective patients to choose not to
get an abortion and providers to stop performing abortions for reasons
other than a changed opinion about the morality of the procedure. 278
1.

The Court's Current Assumptions about the Intersection of the
Free Speech Right and the Right to Choose Abortion

Several recent decisions indicate the Court's assumptions about
the intersection of the free speech right and the right to choose
abortion. In Frisby v. Schultz, the Court reviewed a local ordinance
that banned residential picketing.279 The town enacted the ordinance
in response to a series of protests staged by pro-life activists outside
the home of a physician who performed abortions. "[T]he practice of
picketing before or about residences and dwellings," the town claimed,
274. Paulsen & McConnell, supra note 23, at 271.
275. Id.
276. Ledewitz, supra note 53, at 90. ·
277. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) ("(T]he risks associated with an abortion increase if the patient suffers
from additional stress and anxiety. Increased stress and anxiety can cause patients to:
(1) have elevated blood pressure; (2) hyperventilate; (3) require sedation; or (4) require
special counseling and attention before they are able to obtain health care. Patients may
become so agitated that they are unable to lie still in the operating room thereby increasing
the risks associated with surgery."), aff' d sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d
359 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated in part on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en bane),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996); S. REP.No. 117, supra note 6, at 15 ("Women who do
make it in [after confronting abortion protesters] have a heightened level of anxiety and a
greater risk of complications." (testimony of Dr. Pablo Rodriguez before the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee, May 12, 1993)).
278. See, e.g., S. REP.No. 117, supra note 6, at 17 (detailing how abortion providers
"have succumbed to ... intimidation and threats . .. [and] stopped performing abortions").
279. 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988).
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"causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants . .. [and]
has as its object the harassing of such occupants."280
The Court viewed the ordinance as "operat[ing] at the core of the
First Amendment by prohibiting [the protesters] from engaging in
picketing on an issue of public concem," 281 and restricting speech in a
traditional public forum.282 Because it deemed the o~nance a
content-neutral restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, it
asked whether the ordinance was "'narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest' and whether it 'le[ft] open ample
alternative channels of communication. "' 283 It addressed the second
prong of the test first because it was "so easily answered."284
Construing the ordinance as prohibiting only picketing "directed at a
particular residence," the Court noted that "the ordinance permits the .
more general dissemination of a message."285 Because the protesters
were not barred entirely from residential neighborhoods, the ordinance
"preserve[d] ample alternative channels of communication."286
The Court then turned to the question of whether the ordinance
was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. The
Court found the significant government interest served by the
regulation to be "the protection of residential privacy." 287 An
"important aspect of residential privacy," the Court noted, "is
protection of the unwilling listener."288 In other locations, the burden
is on the recipients to avoid speech that they do not want to hear.289

280 . Id. at 477.
281. Id. at 479.
282. Id. at 481 ("[A]ll public streets are held in the public trust and are properly
considered traditional public fora. .. . The residential character of . . . streets ... does not
lead to a different test.").
283 . Id. at 482 (quoting Perry Educ . Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983)).
284 . Id.
285 . Id. at 483 .
286 . Id. at 484 ("' [Protesters] may enter [residential] neighborhoods, alone or in
groups, even marching . . . . They may go door-to-door to proselytize their views. They may
distribute literature in this manner . . . or through the mails. They may contact residents by
telephone, short of harassment.' " (citation omitted)).
287. Id.
288 . Id.
289. Id. (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971)).
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But "[t]here simply is no right to force speech into the home of an
unwilling listener."290
As to the tailoring, the Court observed that the ordinance
prohibited only picketing "directed at the household, not the public." 291
Picketers who target a household, the Court noted, "generally do not
seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude
upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive
way."292 Even if some have "a broader communicative purpose," their
activity "nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential
privacy."293 As for the harms suffered by the targets, the Court
observed, ""'[the] tensions and pressures may be psychological, not
physical, but they are not~ for that reason, less inimical to family
privacy and truly domestic tranquillity.""' 294 "[B]ecause of the unique
and subtle impact of such picketing," the Court reasoned, a resident "is
left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech."295
Therefore, the Court found the "complete ban of [a] particular medium
of expression" to be narrowly tailored and upheld the ordinance
against a constitutional challenge.296
Although not dealing specifically with abortion protest, the
Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
291
C<isey,
resolved another question pertaining to the extent to which
the right to choose abortion allows an abortion seeker to shield herself
from undesired information. At issue in that case was a Pennsylvania
statute that required, as a precondition to performing an abortion, that
physicians inform patients "of the nature of the procedure, the health
risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational
age of the unborn child. "'~98 The statute also required that the
physician inform the patient of the availability of state-published
information "describing the fetus and providing information about
medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from
290. Id. at 485.
291. Id. at 486.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)(quotingCity of Wauwatosav. King, 182 N.W.2d530,537 (Wis. 1971))).
295. ld.at487.
296. Id. at 488.
297. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
298. Id. at 881.
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the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other
services as alternatives to abortion." 299 Tiie Court overruled prior
cases and held that the state-mandated provision of ''truthful,
norunisleading infonnation" to abortion seekers did not substantially
burden the right to choose abortion. 300 The state's legitimate purpose
of "attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full
consequences of her decision," served the abortion seeker's interest as
well by protecting her from the "devastating psychological
consequences'' of discovering ''that her decision was not fully
infonned ."301
Most recently, the Supreme Court reviewed an injunction issued
by a Florida state court designed to prevent the harassment and
intimidation of abortion clinic staff and patients as well as to prevent
violence and threats of violence against them. 302 The Court upheld a
thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the clinic's entrances and
driveway,303 noting the "distinction between the type of focused
picketing [directed primarily at patients and staff of the clinic] banned
from the buffer zone and the type of generally disseminated
communication that cannot be completely banned in public places," 304
and also upheld a restriction on noise levels during surgery and
recovery periods. 305
The provisions the Court invalidated included a ban on "'images
observable' [to] .. . the patients inside the clinic" during the hours of
surgery and recovery, a 300-foot buffer zone around the clinic in which
the protesters could not approach persons seeking services of the clinic
unless such persons indicated a desire to communicate; and a 300-foot
299. Id.

300. Id. at 882.
301. Id.
302. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2521 (1994).
303. The Court invalidatedthe buffer zone as applied to private property. Id. at 2528
("Absent evidencethat petitionersstanding on the private property have obstructed access to
the clinic, blocked vehicular traffic, or otherwise unlawfully interfered with the clinic's
operation, this portion of the buffer zone fails to serve the significant governmentinterests
relied on by the Aorida SupremeCourt.").
304. Id. at 2527. The Court also noted that "[t]he state court seems to have had few
other options to protect access given the narrow confines around the clinic," that protesters
standing outside the buffer zone "can still be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots,"
and that the original, more narrow injunction "did not succeed in protecting access to the
clinic." Id.
305. Id. at 2528 ('The First Amendmentdoes not demand that patients at a medical
facilityundertake Herculeaneffortsto escape the cacophonyof political protests.").
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no-protest zone around the residences of clinic staff.306 The Court
found the "images observable" provision too broad because it
prohibited speech beyond "threats or veiled threats," which are
"clearly ... proscribable."307 Even if the ban "was intended to reduce
the level of anxiety and hypertension suffered by the patients inside the
clinic," it was unconstitutional because such patient reactions would
be content-based,308 and the clinic had available the option of
"pull[ing] its curtains."309 As to the no-approach provision, the Court
noted that the issuing court's purpose was to prevent clinic patients
and staff from being "stalked" or "shadowed" as they approached the
clinic.310 Nevertheless, the Court found the absolute prohibition to
"burden[] more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to
ensure access to the clinic,"31" quoting again the oft-repeated principle
that "'in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. "' 312 Finally, the
Court observed that the 300-foot residential buffer zone was "much
larger than the zone provided for in the ordinance . . . approved in
Frisby."313 Because of its size, the Court concluded that the zone
would prohibit general, as well as focused, protest, and that "a
limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets

306. Id. at 2528-29.
307, Id. at 2529 . .
308. Id. ('The only plausible reason a patient would be bothered by 'images
observable' inside the clinic would be if the patient found the expression contained in such
images disagreeable."). Crucial to the Court is the distinction between government
regulations "based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed,"
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 401 (1992), and those enacted "without reference
to the content of the regulated speech," Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989). Speech restrictions based upon the subjective reaction of listeners, such as their
offense or discomfort, are suspect because the reactions depend upon the message conveyed
and therefore the regulations are in fact content-based. See R.A.V.,505 U.S. at 414 (White,
J., joined by Blackmun, O'Connor & Stevens, JJ., concurring) ("[S]uch generalized
reactions [as anger, alarm or resentment] are not sufficient to strip expression of its
constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings,
offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected/').
309. Madsen, 114 S. a. at 2529 (noting that pulling the curtains "is much easier for
the clinic ... than for a patient to stop up her ears").
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
313. Id. at 2530.
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outside a smallerzone could have accomplishedthe desired result [i.e.,
prohibitingtargetedresidentialpicketing]."314
These recent decisions reinforce, rather than revise, the Supreme
Court's formal view of the equality that the First Amendment
accommodates.315 They also reveal several reasonablybright lines that
the Court will apply in the context of abortion protest. Abortion
protest restrictionsare unconstitutionalif based on listener reaction to
the message conveyed. Such restrictions may be appropriate if the
speech falls into the "independentlyproscribable" categoriesof threats
of violence316 or "fighting words."317 Those entering abortion clinics
314. Id.
315. The Court's slightly revised standard for reviewing content-neutral injunctions
that prohibit speech in public fora does .not deviate from the traditional principles. Id. at
2524 ("We believe that the[] differences [between generally applicable legislation and
injunctions] require a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment
· principles in th[e] context [of an injunction.]").
316. Id. at 2529 ("Clearly, threats to patients or their families, however
communicated, are proscribable under the First Amendment."). Although the Court
indicated that speech may be restricted if ''necessary to prevent intimidation/' it defines
intimidating speech as occurring only . when it "is so infused with violence as to be
indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm." Id.
317. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942). When the Court
created this exception, it stated that the prohibitable words were "those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. Despite the
disjunctive language, the Court has never upheld a conviction based on injury alone, leading
to speculation that it has been "de facto overruled." Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky
Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argumentfor its Interment, 106 HARV.L. REv. 1129, 1137
(1993). The "breach of the peace" prong has been criticized as reflecting the perspective
only of persons with the social or physical power to dare or be inclined to fight, and thus not
protecting less powerful individuals from the injuries that speech may cause. See, e.g.,
Cynthia G. Bowman,Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106
HARV.J.,.REv.517, 560-61 (1992) ("{T]he fighting words standard, as it has been interpreted
thu.s far, is based upon a male stereotype; it presupposes an encounter between two persons
of relatively equal power who have been socialized to respond to insults with violence:");
Lawrence, sup.ranote 163, at 453-54 ('The fighting words doctrine is a paradigm basedon a
white male point of view."). In fact, since its. origi11alapplication, the "fighting words"
exception has been rarely used. Although the Court recently confronted the opportunity to
review the scope of the "fighting words" doctrine, it declined to do so. See R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992). It is thus unclear what exactly the modem fightingwords exception .encompasses. See Note, ·supra, at 1138 (noting that in its most recent
"fighting words'~ cases decided in the 1970s, the Court, in reciting the constitutional
standard, alternately left out the "inflict injury" prong and repeated the two-pronged
definition). Unquestionably, however, the Court's concept of this exception to the general
rule prohibiting content regulation remains narrow. R.A. ~. 505 U.S. at 384-85 ("It is not
true that 'fighting words' have at most a 'de minimis' expressive content, . . . or that their
content is in all respects 'worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection .... "'
(citations omitted)).
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cannot be protected from all unconsented-to approaches. Rather, the
First Amendment guarantees the protesters access to such individuals,
unless their speech or actions constitute physical threats or effectively
block clinic access. The one exception that the abortion protest cases
recognize to these general rules is that greater government regulation is
· constitutionally permissible when the listener is "captive" in the home
and unable to avoid the speech.318
2.

Revising the Formal Conception of Free Speech Equality to
Accommodate the Equality Interest that Informs the Right to
Choose Abortion

As outlined in the previous section, the Court has delineated a
narrow scope of permissible restrictions of abortion-related speech.
Lower courts, of course, are following, and in some cases arguably
further narrowing,319 these guidelines in issuing state-law injunctions
and in reviewing state and local abortion protest regulations. The ·
FACE Act was drafted and revised to comport with this limited range
of prohibitions as well. Accordingly, the effects of the Supreme
Court's assumptions about the scope and demands of constitutional
equality are broad.
This entire range of abortion protest law, however, is flawed by
the failure of First Amendment doctrine to incorporate, as a
counterbalance to the traditional formal equality assumptions, the
substantive equality interest that informs the right to choose abortion.
Adding this value to the constitutional balance would change several
crucial assumptions that underlie current Supreme Court doctrine.
First, the substantive equality interest would expand the current
"captive audience" protection beyond the home to partially insulate
abortion seekers from certain types of offensive speech within the
immediate vicinity of abortion clinics. Second, this value would
clarify the definition of what constitutes a threat to include the
318. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,485 (1988); see also Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (upholding in a plurality opinion a city policy of
prohibiting politicalc or public-issue advertisements in part because the audience was
captive).
319. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 34 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1994)
(invalidating an injunction provision that required sidewalk counselors to "cease and desist
from such counseling" upon an indication from the prospective counselee that she did not
want to receive such counseling), vacated in part on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
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particular circumstances of abortion seekers. Finally, this value would
change the current presumption that the Constitution ensures peaceful
abortion protesters close physical access to individual abortion seekers
directly outside of abortion clinics.
a.

Reevaluating Listener Captivity in Light of the Equality
Value that Informs the Right to Choose Abortion

Although the Supreme Court and lower courts now talk generally
about not regulating speech based upon listener reaction, the core case
from which the principle stems dealt with speech of a different type
·and in a different context than the most potentially damaging speech
that occurs in abortion protests. fu Cohen v. California,·the Court
reversed the conviction ' for "disturbing the peace ... by ... offensive
conduct" of a defendant who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft" in the Los Angeles County Courthouse. 320 The Court
emphasized first that the "conviction rest[ed] solely upon 'speech,' ...
not ... conduct." 321 The Court then distinguished Cohen's general use
of the four-letter word as a vehicle of political protest from a use
"directed to the person of the hearer," which could be "personally
provocative." 322 The principle that the government may regulate based
upon general public offense "seem[ed] inherently boundless." 323
"[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric," the Court observed, noting
as well that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force." 324 The Court also addressed the state's claim that it
legitimately acted to protect ''unwilling or unsuspecting viewers" from
offense. 325 "[W]e are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech," the Court observed. 326
"The ability of government," it continued, ''to shut off discourse solely
to protect others from hearing it i~ ... dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner." 327
320. 403 U.S. 15, 16-17_(1971).
321. Id. at 18 (citation omitted). 'The only 'conduct' which the State sought to
punish is the fact ofcommunication." Id.
322. Id. at 20.
323. Id. at 25.
324. Id. 25-26.
325. Id. at 21.
326. Id.
327. Id.

at
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Offensive abortion protest speech directed toward individual
abortion seekers in the immediate area surrounding abortion clinics
differs from the offensive expression in Cohen in a number of respects.
First, the most potentially injurious abortion protest speech is not
directed to the public at large and designed to change a general public
policy judgment as in Cohen, but is instead directed toward individual
abortion seekers and designed to affect their personal choices. Second,
the injured listeners of abortion protest speech, upon whose reactions
regulations would be based, are medical patients about to undergo a
surgical procedure. Third, the individual targets of the speech, because
of their gender, cannot choose to ·avoid contact with the speakers,
whereas other citizens can make private choices in their homes and
thereby avoid criticism of their judgments. All of these differences
between abortion protest speech directed at abortion seekers in the
vicinity of abortion clinics and the offensive speech protected in
Cohen and subsequent cases should affect the constitutional
boundaries on such speech restrictions.
As to the nature of the speech, the Court has noted that abortion
protest speech targeted at specific individuals is more subject to
government regulation than generally directed political protest.328 The
Court has emphasized the greater harm to the individual recipients of
the speech as justifying greater government regulation.329 So also the
lesser social value of unwelcome, individually directed speech should
tip the scales in favor of greater government regulation. In Cohen, the
speech was directed toward the entire public that might come in
contact with the message during the course of the day. Presumably,
some viewers would be offended and perceive the message to be
unwelcome, but some would not. These latter listeners might well be
stirred by the contribution to public debate. By contrast, individually
directed speech has a sole target. Where the target does not want to
receive the message, the message will likely not serve the purpose of
enhancing any type of debate, much less one directed at the
appropriate aims of public policy. Instead, it will result in the private
328. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2527 (1994) ("'The type
of focused picketing prohibited by [the state court injunction] is fundamentally different
from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned
in [public places]."' (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,486 (1988))).
329. See, e.g., Frisby,487 U.S. at 486 ('The devastating effect of targeted picketing
on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt.").
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harm of personal offense ..330 Moreover, where the purpose of the
communication is to influence a particular private choice rather than a
broad social policy, the expression is similarly less valuable as political
speech.331 Fot these reasons, that certain abortion protest speech is
(1) directed at individual abortion seekers (2) who have not chosen to
receive the speech (3) for the purpose of changing their choices to
have abortions should temper Cohen's general principle that the
government may not regulate speech because of listeners' reactions to

it.
The Court has also noted that it is appropriate to· ''take account of
the place to which the [speech] regulations apply in determining
whether the[] restrictions burden more speech than necessary."332 In
particular, hospitals and medical facilities constitute sites where greater ·
than ordinary regulation may be necessary to red.uce ""'emotional
strain and worry'"" and to facilitate ""'a restful, uncluttered, relaxing,
and helpful atmosphere.""' 333 Protesters confront abortion seekers
directly outside the facility in which the patients are soon to undergo a
surgical procedure. Arguably, any sort of confrontation may be
disturbing and distracting. A confrontation in which the speaker
questions the very nature of the procedure, attempting to induce guilt
and shame in the patient, is much more so. Moreover, the evidence
. indicates that · the speech offered in these encounters is often not
peaceful, quiet, or reasonable discussion, but includes name-calling
and shouting as the speaker becomes frustrated at the lack of response.
Obviously, the impact of such encounters on patients about to undergo
medical procedures goes beyond disturbing and distracting to

330. Certainly, it is possible that some abor:tion seekers will find their opinions about
· abortion changed by information that they would riot have chosen to receive. But elevating
one individual's right to thrust unwanted information on another violates the equal respect
for decisional autonomy to which each citizen is entitled. See Janet 1\,1.Cohen, A
Jurisdiction of Doubt: Deliberative Autonomy and Abortion, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & LAW
175, 187-88 (1992). State-mandated information about the nature of the abortion process
and the status of the fetus, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 882 (1992), is distinguishable because, by contrast to opinions held by other citizens,
there.is some guarantee that it will be "truthful" and not ''misleading."
331. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (making this point in the context of
injunctions).
332. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
333. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 783-84 n:12 (1979)
(quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 509 (1978) (Black, J., concurring in
judgment))).
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extremely stressful, psychologically damaging, and deleterious to
optimal surgery and recovery.334
These effects of abortion protest speech on abortion seekers,
although arguably dependent on the listeners' reaction to the content of
the speech, are substantially· more severe than the expected effects of
the offensive speech in Cohen. As a general matter, there is a
significant difference in the potential health consequences of enduring
psychological stress and anxiety before a court appearance and before
undergoing ·surgery. Moreover, even if the importance of reducing
stress and anxiety near co~rthouses were recognized, the nature of the
speech in Cohen was not such as to increase that stress unduly. Mr.
Cohen delivered his message to the public at large, and he did so in a
way that recipients could quite quickly turn away and avoid any further
contact with the message . In addition, he challenged a public policy,
rather than the recipients' personal choice to appear in the particular
location. By contrast, . certain abortion protest speech delivered
immediately prior to a medical procedure: (I) targets the individual
patients; (2) does so intrusively and pervasively; and (3) speaks
directly to the propriety of the surgical procedure that the patients are
about to undergo. All of these factors substantially increase the
likelihood that the listener's reaction will go beyond general offense to
severe stress and anxiety that, in turn, may result in physical
manifestations before, during, or after the medical procedure. 335 · As
with the personally directed nature of the speech, these vastly more
severe effects of abortion protest speech should alter the · Cohen
principle that the government cannot regulate speech based upon
listener reaction.
The third reason for tempering the Cohen rule in the context of
abortion protest speech sterns from the equality interest that informs
the right to choose abortion. As detailed earlier,336 the equality interest
is that between pregnant women who do not want to carry the fetus to
term and all other citizens. Confining the free speech exception to
targeted protest outside private residences has an unequal impact on
pregnant women who want to choose abortion.
Specifically,
nonpregnant people can exercise their choice not to use their bodies to
aid others in the privacy of their homes. They do not have to take to
334. See supra notes 12-14and accompanyingtext.
335. See supra note 12.
336. See supra notes 87~93and accompanyingtext.

1434.

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70: 1359

the public streets to vindicate that choice. With particular respect to a
responsibility to aid unborn or born offspring, men can create such
offspring in private and decide to aid or refuse aid to such offspring
without any public manifestation of the choice. The possibility of
privacy does not exist for women, for whom conceiving a child must
be acknowledged in public at some point, either by using the public
streets to gain access to abortion or by the public display of carrying
the child to term. So a speech analysis that protects individuals from
painful, disturbing, or psychologically damaging expression only in the
home treats women who choose abortion differently from other
individuals who choose not to aid others and, thus, violates the
equality ideal that shou~dunderlie the right to choose abortion.
In sum, a number of crucial differences between the facts that
generated the general rule that speech may not be regulated based upon
listener reaction, and the circumstances that surround certain abortion
protest speech, dictate that the general rule does not properly resolve
the apparent tension between the free speech rights of those who
oppose abortion and the right to choose of those who seek to undergo
the abortion procedure. Instead, the following aspects of certain
abortion protest speech render it amenable to government regulation
based upon listeners' reactions: ( 1) It is directed at individual patients
challenging their personal choice to have an abortion; (2) it occurs
during the same timeframe in which they are to undergo the medical
procedur~; and (3) it is possible because the biology of women forces
them into public view in order to make their choice not to use their
bodies to aid another human being.
b.

Defining Threatening Speech in the Particular Context of
Abortion Protest

The impact of speech may differ according to the respective
social and political powers of the speaker and recipient.337
Specifically, vehement exhortation targeted at individuals seeking
abortions may have a particularly painful or destructive impact
337. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 163, at 461, 472-73 ('There is a great difference
between the offensiveness of words that you would rather not hear-becaus e they are
labeled dirty, impolite, or personally demeaning-and the injury inflicted by words that
remind the world that you are fair game for physical attack, evoke in you all of the millions
of cultural lessons regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed, and ·
imprint upon you a badge of servitude and subservience for all the world to see.").
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because of the historically subordinated role of women in American
society.338 Abortion protesters are able to exploit the fears of stigma
and discovery because these fears have particular significance in the
context of abortion. For example, women who seek abortions are
stigmatized in ways that people who refuse to give aid in other ways
are not because of the social expectations about the appropriate role of
women.339 Moreover, the fear of discovery is not just of stigma, but of
physical violence or financial abandonment by male partners-,both
dangers experienced particularly acutely by women.340 In addition,
women may generally perceive the mode of delivering messages
differently than men; the more vulnerable position of women to male
violence causes women to perceive threats more readily.341 All of
these different effects of antiabortion speech on women seeking
abortions mean that the Court's current First Amendment assumptions
require abortion seekers to bear a larger burden of the commitment to
free speech than do individuals who otherwise choose not to use their
bodies to enable others to survive.342 Consequently, the Court should
ask whether particular speech constitutes a threat from the perspective
338. See id. at 453 ("The subordinated victim of fighting words also is silenced by her
relatively powerless position in society.").
339. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 330, at 193-219 (chronicling the history of abortion
restrictions with particular focus on the move toward government intervention in abortion
seekers' deliberative autonomy); Sunstein, supra note 80, at 36 ("[T]he history of abortion
restrictions unambiguously supports the claim that in fact, such restrictions are closely tied
up with, indeed in practice driven by, traditional ideas about women's proper role.").
340. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893
(1992) (finding that a spousal notification requirement for women seeking abortions
women "may
·constitutes an undue burden on the right to choose abortion because
have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their decision to obtain
an abortion," including "fears of physical abuse," fears of "provok[ing] further instances of
child abuse," fears of "devastating forms of psychological abuse ... including verbal
harassment, threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement
to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family
and friends").
341. Cf Bowman, supra note 317, at 535 ("[Any incident of street harassment]
remind[s] women that they are vulnerable to attack and demonstrate[s] that any man may
choose to invade a woman's personal space, physically or psychologically, if he feels like
it.").
342. See Lawrence, supra note 163, at 472 ("Whenever we decide that racist hate
speech must be tolerated because of the importance of tolerating unpopular speech we ask
blacks and other subordinated groups to bear a burden for the good of society--to pay the
price for the societal benefit of creating more room for speech .. . . We must be careful that
the ease with which we strike the balance against the regulation of racist speech is in no way
influenced by the fact that the cost will be borne by others.").

many
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of abortion se¢k.ers,rather than from the perspective of members of the
general public who are generally expected to ignore harsh messages
and tum away.
c.

Reevaluating Abortion Protesters' Right of .Access to
Individual Abortion Seekers

The above analysis calls into question the Court's interpretation
of the Constitution to require · that abortion protesters have close
physical access to abortion seekers directly outside of the medical
facilities in ·which the abortion will immediately be performed.
According to the Court, restricting such access would ''burden[] more
speech than necessary'' to achieve legitimate governmental
objectives.343 The Court's current understanding of appropriate
governmental objectives, however, is unduly narrow, most notably
omitting the equality interest that underlies the right to choose
abortion. A different, more precise analysis than the Court's general
rule would strike a better balance between the free speech right and the
right to choose abortion.
Although the range of abortion protest activities varies, the acts
can be divided into a number of categories according to two
variables-the nature of the speech and the proximity of the speaker to
the recipient. These categories are: (1) speech directed at individuals
at close range; (2) speech directed at individuals from further away;
(3) publicly directed speech in close proximity to particular abortion
seekers or providers; ·and (4) publicly directed speech without close
proximity. The constitutional analysis that best accommodates the free
speech right and the right to choose abortion _differs for each category.
(i) · Targeted Speech in Close Proximity to the Recipient
Within the category of expression directed at particular abortion
~eekers or providers that involve close physical proximity are acts such
as efforts to engage in face-to-face conversation, pressing the
acceptance of literature, and displaying props such as fetus replicas in
front of _individuals' faces. That the speech is directed at certain
individuals· rather than the public generally reduces its First

343: Madsen v. Women'sHealthCtr.,Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994).
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Amendment protection under the Court's current analysis.344 The
addition of forced physical proximity345 should · alter the Court's
current balance. Certainly, the mode of expression affects its
communicative value,346 and those who want to engage in these
activities argue that proximity helps them accomplish their objectives
most effectively.347 But the question is whether they have a
constitutional right to do so. For a number of reasons, they do not.
First, the constitutional right to physical access as ru:i aid to
speaking only even arguably attaches when the purpose of the access is.
communication.348 With abortion-related ·speech outside of health
clinics, this will often not be the case. Close physicctl·proximity has
as well as facilitate meaningful:
the potential to th~ten
communication. To the .extent that it is likely to be perceived as a
threat, it is proscribable.349 If the Court's analysis were to explicitly
take into account the perspective of abortion seekers ·in making this
determination of whether closely proximate communications
constitute threats, a greater range of such speech would be proscribable
even under current free speech doctrine.350 At a lesser, but still severe,
level of potential injury than a physical threat, is speech that induces
344. Id. at 2527 (distinguishing between "focused picketing',' and "generally
disseminated communication").
345. "Physical proximity" is obviously subject to definition, but the general guideline
should be a distance that protects personal spact}-an approximately 8-12 foot radius around
the intended recipient. ''Forced" also requires definition because it can mean either seeking
to communicate within -the personal space without explicit pennis~ion or refusing to
withdraw upon request. This section will argue that either type of forced physical access
should be prohibitable.
346. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[M]uch linguistic expression
serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.").
·
347. See Note, Too Closefor Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Facilities, 101
HARV
. L. REV.· 1856, 1862 (1988) ("[F]orced proximity combined with speech has
expressive value [b)ecause it might serve to transmit and amplify speech, facilitate particular
modes of expression,' enhance the dramatic impact of speech, and convey · symbolic
messages .... ").
348. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of SymbolicSpeech Underthe First
Amendment,21 UCLA L. REv.29, 36 (1973) ("Whatever else may or may not be true of
speech, as an irreducible minimum it must constitute a communication."), .
349 . Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 (1994) ("nlhreats
to patients or their families, however communicated, are proscribable under the First
Amendment.").
350. See supra notes 337-342 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court should
consider the perspective of abortion seekers in evaluating whether particular speech is
threatening).
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stress and anxiety, with resulting physical effects before, during, or
after the abortion procedure. Although the Court has recognized this
possibility in the context of some protest regulations,351 the likelihood
of such effects and the equality interest that underlies the right to
choose abortion should cause the Court to extend its recognition to
alter the presumption that abortion protesters should have close
physical access to abortion seekers during the timeframe immediately
surrounding the procedure. Even absent health effects, using words at
close physical proximity to the recipient also has the potential to
badger, distract, and annoy. These effects, too, are not communicative
and do ·not contribute to meaningful public debate. The equality
interest in allowing abortion seekers to avoid these effects should
similarly upset the Court's current presumption that permitting the
opportunity to have such effects on the recipient is the constitutional
norm.
Even if the purpose of close proximity is to communicate, the
constitutional value of promoting equality among the recipients of
disturbing or offensive speech outweighs the constitutional value of ·
allowing the speakers .close access to accomplish their purpose. Most
important conceptually is the recognition that characterizing the lack
of physical access as a burden on speakers takes as the baseline
unimpeded access to abortion seekers. But, as pointed out earlier, this
baseline incorporates physical and social inequalities.352 Therefore, it
is restricting access to abortion seekers that in fact effectuates the
equality of private decisionmaking and choice between abortion
seekers and others.353
And the loss of opportunity for the speakers, although perhaps
felt as a severe impingement on their wishes, is not of the same
constitutional weight as the equ~ity interest of the recipient. Because
of the socially lesser value of targeted speech challenging a particular
personal choice, the location and timing of the speech, and the interest
of the recipient in not receiving it, such speakers simply do not have a
constitutional right to deliver their messages .in their most preferred
351. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (upholding "limited noise restrictions" as
"necessaryto ensure the health and well-beingof the patientsat the clinic").
352. See supra note 336 and accompanyingtext {arguingthat the equalityinterestthat
underlies the right to choose abortion should justify greater regulation of abortion protest
·
activitiesoutsideabortionclinics).
353. See Cohen, supra note 330, at 175 (arguingthat the Court insufficientlyprotects
femaledecisionalautonomyin the context of abortion).
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way. Other options are available. Most notably, such speakers can
advertise their desire to speak with individual abortion seekers from a
further, but still visible or audible, distance. Those who want to hear
the message can take advantage of the opportunity. Those who want
to avoid the personal challenge at a particularly vulnerabletime can do
so. The particular messages of publicly directed speech may still be
visible or audible, and may intrude on some abortion seekers'
sensibilities. Although it may frustrate some desires, this arrangement
most fairly ensures that the constitutionally significant interests of both
the speakers and the potential 'recipients are fulfilled.
Accordingly, abortion protest expression directed at particular
individuals that involves close physical proximity should . be
proscribable~ither statutorily or by injunction. In the area directly
surrounding abortion clinics, rules requiring speakers to "cease and
desist" upon the indication of the recipient that she does not want to
hear the information should be constitutional.354 Moreover, the above
analysis further indicates that the Court's analysis of the no-approach
zone in Madsen was unduly weighed toward the speakers rather than
the abortion seekers. In constitutional doctrine, the burden should shift
from being on the target to avoid contact to being on the speaker to
ascertain that communication has been requested. Under this view,
sidewalk counselors may make clear that their services are available,
but there should not be a constitutional difficulty with abortion seekers
being the ones to instigate the personal contact. This same analysis
should apply to displays, offering literature, and other personal
encounters where the purpose is to challenge the individual's medical
choice. Communicative contact may be made available at a
reasonable distance from potential recipients, but not forced upon
them at close range.
(ii) Targeted Speech without Close Proximity to the
Recipient

The next category of activities encompasses those directed at
particular individuals questioning their individual medical choice, but
without intrusive physical proximity. These activities include speech
354. But see Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 34 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1994)
(invalidating such a restriction), vacated in part on reh'g en bane, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir.
1995) (en bane), cert. granted, 116 S. a. 1260 (1996).
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directed at the individuals orally and through signs that use individual
names. Because the adverse effects of close physical proximity are, by
definition, not present with this type of speech, some of the strong
reasons for restricting it disappear. .Nevertheless, enough potential
adverse effects remain to justify substantial regulation of such targeted
speech.
fu the context of targeted speech, whether or not it occurs within
close proximity of the recipient, the question must always be the
justification for the protesters' claim that they have a constitutional
right to locate their targets and communicate with them in their chos_en
manner. Medical and biological circumstances hold pregnant women
captive to abortion protesters outside of health clinics. The equality
value that underpins the right to choose abortion thus dictates that the
protesters are not constitutionally entitled to force their message on
these women. Proximity is one means of forcing a message, but loud,
directed speaking, or signs identifying the target of the communication
are others. The equality value indicates that the limit of directed
communication should be a simple indication that the protester desires
to engage in one-on-one communication about the abortion procedure.
The pregnant woman, being as she is an equal citizen entitled to make
her own choices with or without consultation as she deems
appropriate, should then have the option of seeking the
communication or refusing it, and not being personally pursued any
further.
fu addition to the equality value and the medical setting of the
communications, a context-sensitive assessment of what constitutes a
threat should lead to greater re~atiori of nonproximate targeted
speech as well. fu particular, signs or other means used by protesters
to communicate with abortion seekers that they have learned and are
willing to publicize their personal identities may reasonably be
perceived as threats for several reasons. One source of the threat may
be the abortion protesters. An indication to an abortion seeker that
she, personally, is the object of the protest may reasonably cause her to
fear for her safety, both outside the clinic and after she leaves. The
size of the protesting crowd and the nature of its behavior may
accentuate these fears. fu addition, many abortion seekers may
reasonably fear violence not only from abortion protesters, but from
male partners at home. Protest actions that reveal their identities make
such violence more likely and therefore may reasonably be perceived
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as threats. For this reason as well, targeted communications to
abortion seekers outside of abortion clinics should be proscribable
even if they occur outside of a close physical proximity to the
recipient.
(iii) Public Speech in Close Proximity to the Recipient
Abortion protest activities that constitute closely proximate
public speech include holding signs, speaking in a general "soapbox"
style, or chanting, singing, or praying within several feet of abortion
seekers. Such speech about public issues directed toward the public
occupies the "highest rung" of First Amendment protection.355
Government restrictions . on such speech are suspect because they
reduce the ideas available for public consideration and debate. Despite
this high value, however, the proximity of protesters to abortion
seekers may justify some regulation of this speech.
The question in this context is whether abortion protesters should
be allowed to force proximity to deliver a public message. The social
value in permitting the message to be delivered is strong. But the
equality interest of the abortion seeker in avoiding unwanted speecheven that which is socially valuable356-remains strong as well.
Moreover, close proximity adds to the likelihood that even publicly
directed messages will be perceived as threatening, or that the mode of
delivering the message will effectively impede access to abortion
services. Protesters allowed close access to abortion seekers may also
be strongly tempted to abuse it by engaging in personal confrontations,
and, at the scene of a protest, enforcement of a rigid, public-message
requirement may be difficult.
Consequently, where statutes or injunctions prohibit publicly
directed protest activities within close proximity to abortion seekers,
courts must look carefully at the particular circumstances to determine
the appropriate constitutional balance. Where it appears possible to
separate out and permit the delivery of nonthreatening and
nonobstructive public messages in close proximity to abortion seekers,

355. Careyv. Brown,447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980).
356. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("[N]o
one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwillingrecipient.").
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this balance may be appropriate.357 Where, however, the facts indicate
that threats, obstruction, or targeted messages are reasonably probable,
prohibition of such speech activities should be constitutionally
permissible. Although the best context for this inquiry would be an
injunction hearing where the parties and nature of the protest activities
are clearly delineated, legislatures may also strike this balance based
on the factual history of abortion protests within their jurisdiction,
perhaps allowing for exemptions for particular pre-planned protest
activities.
(iv) Public Speech · without Close Proximity to the
Recipient
It is in the context of publicly directed expression delivered at a
reasonable distance from abortion seekers that the Court's current
analysis should apply. That is, such speech should be regulable only to
the extent necessary to preserve access to, or protect the healthful
environment around, abortion facilities.358 Publicly directed speech
about public issues is the paradigm of speech that all citizens, in the
interest of full and open public debate, are expected to tolerate or
ignore, even if they find the message offensive or disturbing. To be
sure, abortion seekers will still be disproportionately subject to such
messages because of physical and medical circumstances that they
cannot avoid. But the value of the speech at issue, and the lower
personal costs it is likely to impose because of its content and nature of
delivery, dictate that the constitutional value of the speech outweighs
the abortion seekers' interest in avoiding it.
IV. CONCLUSION
•.

Unquestionably, violent abortion protest activities must be
stopped. Neither the constitutional nor policy concerns about
suppressing expression inherent in such conduct should stand in the
way of government efforts to do so. At the same time, lines must be
carefully drawn. Nonviolent, publicly expressive abortion protest,
357. A nonviolent sit-in outside of an abortion clinic by a group of protesters that
does not have a history of abusing close physical access to abortion seekers.is one possible
example.
358. See Madsen v. Women's Health Qr ., Inc., 114 S. Q. 2516, 2526-28 (1994)
(upholding restrictions on protest activities deemed necessary to "protect access" for
"(n]oise control").
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even if it invades some individual legal rights or involves lawbreaking,
is socially valuable and is entitled to special consideration in the
lawmaking process. Because it is possible to excise such valuable
conduct from restrictions aimed at violent lawbreaking, policymakers
should do so. Such an exception would not only realize the social
value of nonviolent political protest, it is also consistent with the
equality interest that underlies the right to choose abortion. Publicly
directed protest activities impose costs that individuals can usually
bear, and the possibility of an injunction in particular circumstances
resolves the situations where the costs of the conduct on individuals is
unusually high. Mos.t important, those who have the majority on their
side should remember the value of preserving the option of nonviolent
political protest as a continuing guarantee of equality.
While in the above respect the assumption about the range of
government restrictions is unduly broad, in another respect, it is too
narrow. It is not only physically violent abortion protest that must be
stopped, but also psychologically damaging, discomforting protest,
when the social value of such protest does not outweigh the costs
borne by individuals. The targeted nature of such abortion protest
speech that is directed to patients about to undergo a medical
procedure, and the equality value that underlies the right to choose
abortion, suggest that limiting protection from such speech to the
home is too narrow. Speech targeted at specific abortion seekers and
made in close physical proximity to them should be prohibitable to
varying degrees because it subjects abortion seekers to particular
torments based on their sex and because such directed speech does not
significantly contribute to public debate. Expanding the scope of
government regulation in this respect would better serve the social
value that underpins the free speech right and the equality ir:iterestthat
informs the right to choose abortion than does current constitutional
doctrine.

